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For an Anti-discrimination Act for Cyberspace:
Two-Sided Pricing, Walled Gardens, and the
Depletion of the Marketplace of Ideas
JULIEN MAILLAND*
ABSTRACT
In the wake of renewed policy interest for the regulation of Internet
gatekeepers, I argue that the U.S. Congress should pass a sweeping net
neutrality regulation, an Anti-Discrimination Act for Cyberspace. Breaking
with the tradition of siloed research which has seen similar proposals
grounded in economics, computer science, history, political philosophy, and
administrative and constitutional law, as separate matters, I offer a multidisciplinary approach which combines these fields to draw new insights for
Internet law and policy. I argue, with reference to leading Supreme Court
cases, including Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, that such a law
would most likely pass First and Fifth Amendment constitutional muster,
despite Internet service providers’ assertions to the contrary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The freedom of the mind which befits the members of a self-governing
society is not a given and fixed part of human nature. It can be increased …
by bringing [men] together in activities of communication and mutual
understanding. And the federal legislature is not forbidden to engage in that
positive enterprise of cultivating the general intelligence upon which the
success of self-government so obviously depends. On the contrary, in that
positive field the Congress of the United States has a heavy and basic
responsibility to promote the freedom of speech.
Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to SelfGovernment, 19481
It will be up to federal and state policy makers … to reconcile the
competing corporate interests and to create a network that maximizes the
benefits enjoyed by all Americans… Adequate federal … leadership will give
us the power to leverage the millions of dollars into something greater than
the sum of its parts.
Al Gore, Infrastructure for the Global Village, 19912
A lot of [Internet freedom] has to be enforced by the government, and
conservative types and libertarian types say “government shouldn’t have any
say and control over that, that takes away our freedom.” Wrong! It takes
away the freedom of the companies that are taking away the freedom from
us.
Steve Wozniak, interview by Russia Today, 20123
On July 9, 2021, President Joe Biden signed an Executive Order
encouraging the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to restore
the net neutrality rules adopted by the FCC in 2015 under the Obama
administration and undone in 2017 by Chairman Ajit Pai’s FCC under the

1. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948),
reprinted in ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 19-20 (1948) (1960).
2. Al Gore, Infrastructure for the Global Village, 265 SCI. AM. 111 (1991).
3. Steve Wozniak Interview, Web crackdown coming, freedom failing, RUSSIA TODAY (Aug. 14,
2012, 7:27-8:57), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJnghGBBP2Q (transcript by author).
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Trump administration.4 The 2015 Open Internet Order (the “2015 Order”)5
had classified Internet service providers (ISPs) as common carriers under
Title II of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and, on this basis, imposed
on them no blocking, no throttling, and no paid prioritization rules. In
practice, this prevented ISPs from implementing two-sided pricing models:
a model where the ISP charges not only the end-user in order to access the
Internet, but also the sender of content which the user is trying to access.
Where the content provider refuses to pay, or otherwise is disfavored by the
ISP for business, political reasons, or others, the ISP simply blocks or
throttles (slows down) the disfavored content, making it either impossible of
very difficult for the user to access the content at stake. At the heart of this
model is discrimination: a sender of content which is disfavored by the ISP
is blocked. Two-sided pricing models, then, are referred to as “non-neutral,”
and are incompatible with an open Internet. Despite the fact that net
neutrality violations before the 2015 Order had been numerous and well
documented,6 and that an overwhelming and bipartisan majority of
Americans opposed repealing net neutrality regulations,7 in 2017, the FCC
repealed the net neutrality regulations that outlawed two-sided pricing
models, and, generally, blocking, throttling, or paid prioritization, in an order
hypocritically named the Restoring Internet Freedom Order (the “2017
Order”).8 At the time the Biden Executive Order was released in July 2021,
the FCC was deadlocked at two Democratic and two Republican votes. A
4. Specifically, “the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission is encouraged to work with
the rest of the Commission, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to consider: (i) adopting
through appropriate rulemaking ‘Net Neutrality’ rules similar to those previously adopted under title II
of the Communications Act of 1934 (Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as 47 U.S.C. §151 et
seq.), as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, in ‘Protecting and Promoting the Open
Internet,’” 80 Fed. Reg. 19738 (Apr. 13, 2015); Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the
American Economy (July 9, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidentialactions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/.
See also
FACT SHEET: Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy (July 9, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/09/fact-sheet-executive-orderon-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/. See also Timothy Karr, Biden Executive Order
Calls on the FCC to Restore Net Neutrality and Promote Broadband Competition, FREE PRESS (July 9,
2021),
https://www.freepress.net/news/press-releases/biden-executive-order-urges-fcc-restore-netneutrality-and-promote-broadband-competition.
5. See generally In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, WC Docket No. 1428, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-open-internet-order.
6. Timothy Karr, Net Neutrality Violations: A Brief History, FREE PRESS (July 9, 2021),
https://www.freepress.net/our-response/expert-analysis/explainers/net-neutrality-violations-briefhistory.
7. Overwhelming Bipartisan Majority Opposes Repealing Net Neutrality, UNIVERSITY OF
MARYLAND
PROGRAM
FOR
PUBLIC
CONSULTATION
(Dec.
12,
2017),
https://publicconsultation.org/united-states/overwhelming-bipartisan-majority-opposes-repealing-netneutrality/.
8. See generally In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017),
Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2017),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-restoring-internet-freedom-order.
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fifth commissioner being confirmed by the Senate in the months to come
would give the Democrats the advantage they need to successfully, one more
time, reclassify ISPs as common carriers under Title II and impose net
neutrality regulations on that basis. However, it is likely that yet another
reversal of FCC classification would lead to what an attorney for the NCTA,
the ISPs and cable television trade association, had already dubbed in 2014
“‘World War III’ and years of litigation.”9 This article, then explores another
path towards net neutrality, that of federal legislation. I argue that Congress
should break the Gordian Knot created by layers of legislation,
administrative regulations, and years never-ending litigation, and pass a
sweeping net neutrality law from a blank slate: an Anti-Discrimination Act
for Cyberspace.10
There is significant momentum for such legislation. Seven states have
already adopted their own net neutrality legislation (California, Colorado,
Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington). Several others are
set to discuss bills during the 2021 legislative session (including
Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, New York, and South Carolina).11
Further, issues of Internet governance and of the possible regulation of
gatekeepers have found renewed interest in the public eye when former
President Trump, in July 2021, sued Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, over
the suspension of his social media accounts. Trump, in his own words, asked
the court “to order an immediate halt to social media companies’ illegal,
shameful censorship of the American people . . .. . . We’re demanding an end
to the shadow banning, a stop to the silencing and a stop to the blacklisting,
banishing and canceling that you know so well.”12 Meanwhile, a flurry of
new state legislation and of lawsuits, from Florida to Ohio, is seeking to
prevent “Big Tech,” read, content companies such as Google or Facebook,
from banning users or banning certain content, from “fake news” to certain
flavors of political speech.13 At first glance, the constitutional legal issues

9. Kery Murakami, Section 706 or Title II Debated at net neutrality discussion, COMMUNICATIONS
DAILY, July 25, 2014, at 5-6. For an in-depth discussion of the various administrative and constitutional
law arguments being made in favor of and against imposing net neutrality regulations under Title II, see
Barbara Cherry & Julien Mailland, Toward Sustainable Network-Openness Obligations on Broadband in
the U.S.: Surviving Providers First Amendment Challenges, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY RESEARCH
CONFERENCE (TPRC), George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, VA (Sept. 13, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2417758.
10. I refer here not just to the Greek legend, but to the telecommunications policy staple. See
generally W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, LEE MCKNIGHT & RICHARD SOLOMON, THE GORDIAN KNOT:
POLITICAL GRIDLOCK ON THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY (1997).
11. State Net Neutrality Laws May Lead to Federal Legislation, THE NATIONAL L. REV. (Mar. 1,
2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/state-net-neutrality-laws-may-lead-to-federal-legislation.
12. Donald Trump Sues Facebook, YouTube And Twitter For Alleged Censorship, NPR (July 7,
2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/07/1013760153/donald-trump-says-he-is-suing-facebook-googleand-twitter-for-alleged-censorship.
13. See, e.g., Ari Cohn, Trading Big Tech For Big Government Will Backfire For Conservatives,
DAILY CALLER (June 2, 2021), https://dailycaller.com/2021/06/02/cohn-trading-big-tech-for-big-
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raised by the “big tech” discussion are the same as that of the net neutrality
debate: can the government lawfully prevent the suppression of speech by
Internet gatekeepers through no blocking, no discrimination, or must-carry
legislation? In reality, however, an Internet gatekeeper is only afforded First
Amendment protection if they have “engaged in a form of protected
expression,” that is, if their activity is “sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to fall within the scope [of the First Amendment]” (Spence
v. Washington).14 Unfortunately, this crucial preliminary question of
determining the scope of First Amendment protection of a gatekeeper is too
often overlooked, including by proponents of net neutrality regulation.15 In
the case at hand, social media companies and Internet service providers are
in two completely different situations. Social media companies are in the
business of creating and curating content, just like newspapers did in an
analog age, and, as such, are afforded the utmost First Amendment
protections, something which will most likely doom any effort to impose
anti-discrimination rules upon them. As a commentator for Wired Magazine
noted, “[t]he whole value proposition for Google is that it discriminates
between different possible results in order to return what it thinks will be
most relevant to the person doing the search. To ask the court to force
Google ‘to carry search result information reliably, neutrally,’ as the Ohio
lawsuit does, is sort of nonsensical.”16 In contrast, ISPs, whose business
model is simply to carry the speech of others, are no more speakers, from a
First Amendment perspective, than the post office that carries letters.17
Therefore, the body of case law that applies to ISPs as conduits, and not
speakers, is entirely different from the one that applies to content creators or

government-will-backfire-for-conservatives/; Gilad Edelman, No, Facebook and Google Are Not Public
Utilities, WIRED (July 15, 2021), https://www.wired.com/story/no-facebook-google-not-public-utilities/.
14. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11(1974).
15. Nicholas Bramble, Ill Telecommunications: How Internet Infrastructure Providers Lose First
Amendment Protection, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 67, 68 (2010).
16. Gilad Edelman, No, Facebook and Google Are Not Public Utilities, WIRED (July 15, 2021),
https://www.wired.com/story/no-facebook-google-not-public-utilities/.
17. As the FCC noted in the 2015 Order, “Consistent with our determination in the 2010 Open
Internet Order, we find that when broadband providers offer broadband Internet access services, they act
as conduits for the speech of others, not as speakers themselves.” 2015 FCC Open Internet Order at 268,
30 FCC Rcd 5601 (2015), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-15-24A1.pdf (citing Reply
Comments of Professor Barbara A. Cherry & Assistant Professor Julien Mailland, Before the Federal
Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554, Re: In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting
the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28; Framework for Broadband Internet Service, GN Docket No.
10-27; Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191; Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket
no. 07-52 (September 2013)). See generally Nicholas Bramble, Ill Telecommunications: How Internet
Infrastructure Providers Lose First Amendment Protection, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 67,
68 (2010); see also an acknowledgment by Verizon’s lawyers that ISPs are conduits and not speakers:
“the Internet service provider performs a pure transmission or “conduit” function . . .. . . This function is
analogous to the role played by common carriers in transmitting information selected and controlled by
others. Traditionally, this passive role of conduit for the expression of others has not created any duties
or liabilities under the copyright laws.” Brief for Appellant at 23, Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v.
Verizon Internet Serv., 351 F.3d. 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-7015 & 03-7053).
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curators. This article focuses on net neutrality regulations that would apply
to ISPs, not to the regulation of content platforms such as Google or
Facebook. But the fact that policy issues such as the potential regulation of
Internet gatekeepers, in general, have gained the renewed interest of
legislators and interest groups on both sides of the political spectrum, makes
the present argument in favor of a federal net neutrality legislation applicable
to ISPs all the more timely.
I am certainly not the first to argue for such legislation. But as we have
just noted, complex legal issues are too often conflated, and oversimplified,
in order to fit political agendas or even simply to surf the hype and keep up
with the speed of the news cycle. As a few net neutrality researchers from
the field of computer science have noted, policymakers often “prefer a
simple answer to what amounts to a difficult and complicated,
multidisciplinary, set of questions.” 18 And here lies the complexity of
creating sound net neutrality policy: the fact that the issue is, at its core,
multidisciplinary, whereas research on the topic tends to be siloed: in
electrical engineering and computer science journals, in economic journals,
in historical societies, and in law reviews. In contrast, this article grounds a
legal argument, that a federal Anti-Discrimination Act for Cyberspace is
desirable and would pass constitutional muster, in computer science,
economics, history, political theory, and, of course, constitutional law, and
draws new insights for Internet law and policy by combining lessons learned
from these fields. In Part I, I draw from the economics literature to provide
an overview of what one-sided v. two-sided pricing models are, and how
they apply to the information industry, both traditional and in an Internet
setting. I show how and why the Internet industry has bloomed under a onesided pricing model, and how for ISPs to apply a two-sided model would
create a radical shift in economic paradigm for the entire Internet ecosystem.
In Part II, I tie the economic literature on net neutrality to that of the
computer science field, and draw insights with regard to freedom of speech.
I demonstrate how the systematic implementation of two-sided pricing
models by ISPs would drastically affect how the Internet works and be
incompatible, as a matter of principle, with an open Internet. I debunk ISPs’
claims that two-sided pricing model would not impact any speaker
negatively because the ISPs would always leave open a free slow lane, and
demonstrate how such models actually incentivize ISPs to degrade service
rather than invest in network upgrade. The very logic of two-sided pricing,
as applied to data networks, is to block data, by default, from entering the
receiver’s local network, because senders of data are only incentivized to pay
an end-user’s local ISP if that ISP implements censorship by default, which

18. Steven Bauer, David D. Clark & William Lehr, The Evolution of Internet Congestion 29, TPRC
2009 (Aug. 15, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1999830 (emphasis added).
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can only be lifted in exchange for payment. This, in turn, will have an impact
on the wealth of ideas available in the marketplace, lest strong net neutrality
protections banning two-sided pricing models in the open Internet be put in
place. I take this idea further in Part III, where I show what has happened,
in history, to the ability of users to access content, and the ability of
independent content providers to distribute their creations, when barriers
have been erected around last-mile networks. Drawing from industry
publications of the 1980s and early 1990s, and giving specific attention to
walled gardens such as AOL, Compuserve, and Prodigy, I demonstrate that
the walled gardens model led to a balkanized online market and a paucity of
content, which in turn explained the extremely low penetration of online
services in the U.S. retail market, roughly 1% by the time the World Wide
Web was invented, in contrast to countries such as France, which, with their
relatively-open Minitel system, was the most connected country in the world
at the time. As Sir Tim Berners Lee, inventor of the Web, once put it, “when
you erect a wall around the garden, we know now all the flowers bloom
outside the wall, not inside.”19 A reversal towards those walled gardens
model, caused by the very logic of two-sided pricing models, creates a
depletion of the marketplace of ideas, both in terms of sheer volume of
information being able to pass through to users, and in terms of plurality of
views. This issue is exacerbated by the fact that a significant part of the
rhetoric around Internet policy in the past twenty years has revolved around
for-profit uses of the Internet. In Part IV, I show through rhetorical analysis
how we have lost track of “the little guy,” users/content creators who use the
open network of networks as an electronic soap box. The empowering nature
of the Internet has largely been reduced to “consumer empowerment” in the
dominant Internet policy narratives, both against and in favor of net
neutrality. Where in 1997, the Reno court had focused on the role of the
Internet as for anyone, including educational institutions, commercial
entities, advocacy groups, and individuals to publish information,20 the
2010,21 2015, and 2017 Orders oppose “users” to commercial “edge
providers,” the latter being presented as the source of content that matters.
This section sets the stage for Part V. I draw from the political philosophy
of Alexander Meiklejohn, whose interpretation of the meaning of the First
Amendment is a controlling force in positive law and underpins leading
Supreme Court cases that have expanded the freedom of political speech for

19. John Cox, Tim Berners-Lee Warns of ‘Walled Gardens’ for Mobile Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
15,
2007),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/idg/IDG_002570DE00740E1800257394004818F5.htm.
20. Reno v. Am. C. L. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
21. See generally In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, GN
Docket No. 09-191 & WC Docket No. 07-52, Rep. and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 1834 (2010),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/preserving-open-internet-broadband-industry-practices-0.
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Americans, from Terminiello v. Chicago,22 to the so-called Skokie case
where neo-nazis were allowed to march on a public square,23 to Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins,24 where a state constitutional provision which
permitted individuals to exercise free speech rights on the property of a
privately-owned shopping center passed constitutional muster under both the
First and the Fifth Amendment. I make detailed comparisons between the
locus of the old soap box, the shopping center, to that of the electronic soapbox, the ISPs facilities, to show that a net neutrality law that would protect
the right of all speakers, on a content-neutral basis, to pass their speech
through the last-mile ISP, would most likely pass constitutional muster under
the Pruneyard three-prong test. I conclude that in an age where the digital
public forum is controlled by private entities, an Act of Congress that would
ensure net neutrality by prohibiting the implementation of two-sided pricing
models by ISPs, an Anti-Discrimination Act for Cyberspace, is desirable and
legitimated by controlling political philosophy rhetoric in the field of free
speech and Supreme Court precedent.

II. WHAT IS 2-SIDED PRICING, AND HOW DOES IT DIFFER FROM THE
TRADITIONAL PRICING MODEL IN A NEUTRAL, OPEN INTERNET?
Two-sided pricing generally refers to a model where the operator of a
two-sided market charges a fee to participants at both ends of the market. A
two-sided market can itself be defined as “one in which 1) two sets of agents
interact through an intermediary or platform, and 2) the decisions of each set
of agents affect the outcomes of the other set of agents, typically through an
externality.”25 A typical example in the economics literature is that of a
straight-singles bar, where two sets of agents (straight single males and
females) interact through a mating platform (the bar), and where the number
of participants in each side of the market affects the outcomes of the other
set of participants: the more females are present in the bar, the greater the
benefits – externalities - for males, and vice-versa. Other typical examples
include video game consoles (where players and game makers interact
through the console acting as a platform),26 newspapers, and credit card
systems.27 The existence of a two-sided market does not in itself imply twosided pricing. For example, a broadcast television station, as a platform that
22. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
23. Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
24. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
25. Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. OF ECON. PERSPS. 125 (2009).
26. Note that the literature on video game consoles and online systems as platforms is also extensive
in the academic field of Science and Technology Studies and has in particular been the focus of MIT
Press’ Platform Studies book series. See, e.g., DOMINIC ARSENAULT, SUPER POWER, SPOONY BARDS,
AND SILVERWARE: THE SUPER NINTENDO ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEM (2017) (discussing the economic
model of the Nintendo platform); see also JULIEN MAILLAND & KEVIN DRISCOLL, MINITEL: WELCOME
TO THE INTERNET (2017) (discussing the economic models of the Minitel platform).
27. Rysman, supra note 25, at 128.
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delivers programing to viewers (also known as “eyeballs” in that industry)
at the bottom side of the market, and eyeballs to advertisers at the top side of
the market, only charges a dollar fee to participants at the top side of the
market (the advertisers) but not at the bottom side of the market (although
viewers are donating their time and attention to the platform, which is
technically a fee, they are not charged a dollar amount). A straight-singles
bar can chose to apply a one-sided pricing model by not charging one class
of participants (usually females) to prime the pump, reach critical mass, enter
a positive feedback loop and attract paying participants at the other side of
the market (males), and succeed over a competing straight-singles bar that
might have applied a two-sided pricing model by charging both males and
females an entry fee, therefore creating barriers to entry on both ends of the
market rather than just one. Other examples of one-sided pricing models in
two-sided markets include free newspaper models, and yellow pages
directories,28 where advertisers, but nor readers, are charged a dollar fee.
However, the information industry and a number of other industries also
offer plenty of examples of two-sided markets where two-sided pricing
models involving exchanges of dollars on both ends are applied. A
traditional newspaper charges both readers and advertisers; a credit card
company often charges both a yearly fee to the cardholder and a transaction
fee to the merchant.
Internet access facilities are themselves two-sided markets because,
referring to the earlier definition, 1) they provide a platform (a transmission
service) through which two sets of agents (the sender and the receiver of
information), interact, and 2) the decisions of each set of agents affect the
outcomes of the other set of agents through an externality. In this particular
case, the more end-users connect to the Internet, the more people content
providers can reach, and the more content providers connect and spread data
through the networks, the more informational value each end-user will derive
from their respective Internet connection. From a pricing standpoint, the
Internet has historically functioned as a one-sided pricing model, where ISPs
only charge end-users at the level of the last mile,29 that is, the local network
the ISP controls, irrelevant of whether the end-user is mainly a receiver of
information or a sender of information, but do not charge outside senders of
incoming content for entering that last mile and reaching the end-user.30

28. Rysman, supra note 25, at 129.
29. John Musacchio, Galina Schwartz & Jean Walrand, A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Provider
Investment Incentives with an Application to the Net-Neutrality Issue, 8 REV. OF NETWORK ECON., no.1,
2009, at 1-2. See also Nicholas Economides & Joachim Tag, Network Neutrality on the Internet: A TwoSided Market Analysis, 24 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 91, 91-92 (2012).
30. See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & Benjamin E. Hermalin, The Economics of Network Neutrality,
43 THE RAND J. OF ECON. 613 (2012) (“Since its commercialization in the mid-1990s, a party (website
or household) connecting to the Internet pays only its direct provider of access.”). Note, in the added
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Under this traditional model, then, “[w]hile users and content providers each
pay their own ISPs for connectivity, neither need pay other ISPs in order to
reach their customers.”31 One of the key implications of this model is that it
has enabled the implementation of the “‘end-to-end principle’ that has
governed the Internet since its inception,” under which “computers attached
to the Internet that are sending and receiving information packets did not
need to know the structure of the network and could just interact end-toend.”32 In this particular case, the sender’s computer does not need to have
a direct relationship with the receiver’s ISP to communicate with the
receiver’s computer, because the receiver’s ISP is not implementing a twosided pricing model and charging the sender of data. Conversely,
interference with the flow of data, for example in the form of a two-sided
pricing model, puts the end-to-end principle in jeopardy.33 Let us examine a
visual representation of a traditional Internet architecture and data flow to
grasp the import of this one-sided pricing implementation.

emphasis, how the authors do not oppose websites or households, but rather treat them as the same type
of agent, in this case, an entity that connects to a direct provider of access.
31. Nicholas Economides, Why imposing new tolls on third-party content and applications
threatens innovation and will not improve broadband providers’ investment, in NET NEUTRALITY:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEBATE 86, 88 (Jorge Perez Martinez ed., 2010). See also John Musacchio,
Galina Schwartz & Jean Walrand, A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Provider Investment Incentives with
an Application to the Net-Neutrality Issue, 8 REV. OF NETWORK ECON., no. 1, 2009, at 1, 3 (“[I]n a model
with one-sided pricing, end users and content providers pay only for their direct access . . .. . . . Thus,
with one-sided pricing, content provider C1 pays only ISP T1 for its access to the Internet but does not
pay any of the other ISPs.”).
32. Nicholas Economides & Joachim Tag, Network Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-Sided Market
Analysis, 24 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 2012, at 88. See generally the seminal papers on the end-to-end
principle: J.H. Saltzer, D. P. Reed, and D. D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in System Design,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING SYSTEMS
509, PARIS, FRANCE, APR. 8–10, 1981, IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY (1981); J.H. Saltzer, D. P. Reed & D.
D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUT. SYS. 277
(1984).
33. See, e.g., Joint Comments of Internet Engineers, Pioneers, and Technologists on the Technical
Flaws in the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rule-making and the Need for the Light-Touch, Bright-Line
Rules from the Open Internet Order at 21, 82 Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May 18, 2017) (to be codified at
47 CFR pt. 8 and 20), WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017), https://www.eff.org/document/internet-engineerscommentsfcc-nn (“Given the end-to-end principle, any service that appears on the Internet will be
available to ISP customers. However, the end-to-end principle depends on noninterference by ISPs. If the
FCC reclassifies BIAS providers as information services and is unable to enforce light-touch rules against
ISP interference with customer traffic, many new capabilities the FCC has not envisioned will never come
to be.”).
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Figure 1: Physical representation of Internet interconnection34
The Internet is not one network but a network of networks, managed by a
number of different entities in different countries, which hand data off to
each other, so that data moves from one end-user connected through her last
mile, local ISP, to another end-user connected through his own local ISP,
which is often a different ISP from the first one. In this model, each enduser pays a fee to her local ISP, and only to that ISP. In turn, she can either
receive information, send information, or both. Typically, the more
information the user wants to send or receive, the bigger the “pipe” that user
will want to connect to, and the more the last-mile ISP will charge. A person
who only wants to connect to the Internet to read text-only email should be
satisfied with a 56k dial-up service. A casual Netflix viewer only needs a
half a megabit per second connection, 5 Mbps for HD streaming.35 A gamer
who has no tolerance for latency will require a faster connection, and a large
corporation such as Netflix sending a tremendous amount of information
through the ether will want to connect directly to a T1 backbone provider
that can provide large enough bandwidth for Netflix to push its content out
to many different receivers connected to many different local ISPs.36 The

34. kc claffy and D. Clark, Platform Models for Sustainable Internet Regulation, TPRC 41: THE
41ST RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION AND INTERNET POLICY (2013)
(noting that the Internet is constantly in flux, and, in particular, that the traditional model has “flattened”
over the years, particularly with the introduction of content delivery networks (CDNs), something that is
discussed in detailed in the article cited herewith – this point, however, is besides the scope of the present
article, and the traditional representation of the Internet interconnection model suffices for the arguments
at hand).
35. Internet Connection Speed Recommendations, NETFLIX, https://help.netflix.com/en/node/306
(last visited Aug. 13, 2021).
36. Or they might instead want to use content delivery networks (CDNs) close to locales where it
operates. See, e.g., kc claffy and D. Clark, Platform Models for Sustainable Internet Regulation, TPRC
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more the bandwidth, whether upstream (data being sent) or downstream
(data being received), the more the user will be charged by its last-mile
Internet access facility operator. Also note that in the early days of the public
Internet, price differentiation through versioning in this one-sided pricing
model was implemented by using minutes, rather than bandwidth, as the
measurement unit.37 But in either case, even when it implemented pricediscrimination schemes, the network operator only ever charged end-users at
one end of the market, that is, at the end of the last mile that it itself controls.
The way the data is handed off between operators at the core of the network
of networks is of no concern to either the sender or the receiver. In other
words, a user in Germany wanting to send an email to his cousin in the US
only needs to pay a fee to his local German ISP for the message to be
received by the cousin who is likewise paying a fee to his local US ISP. The
process is the same if the German cousin, instead of using his Internet access
to send out emails, uses it to hook a blog, a personal webpage, or a small
business webpage it hosts on his local computer, to the Internet at large. In
both cases, communication is established between the German sender of
content and the US receiver of content through a single payment by the
sender to his ISP and a single payment by the receiver to his ISP (Figure 2).

41: THE 41ST RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION AND INTERNET POLICY
(2013).
37. For example, in 1996 AOL dialup subscribers paid $19.95 for the first 20 hours, and $2.95 for
each additional hour. See Steven Bauer, David D. Clark and William Lehr, The Evolution of Internet
Congestion 14, TPRC 2009 (Aug. 15, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1999830.
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Figure 2: Data flows from one user to the other by being handed off from
one another by the various operators (ISPs) located at the core of the
network, with whom the end users have no relationship. The one-sided
pricing implementation enables virtual communication between end-users
connected to the Internet through separate ISPs and who pay a fee only to
their local ISP.38
In other words, applying a one-sided pricing model to a two-sided market
has enabled anyone in the world at the bottom side of their local two-sided
market, by paying one single fee to their local ISP, to exchange information
with anyone else in the world who has also connected to the Internet by
paying one single fee to their local ISP. This was a major departure from
previous online models, where subscribers to services such as AOL or
CompuServe could only access content produced by other market
participants who had a direct contractual relationship with AOL or
CompuServe. We will return to the discussion of AOL and CompuServe
being walled gardens, and the implications of such models on the
marketplace of ideas and democratic discourse, in Part III. For now, let us
examine how a shift in pricing models from one to two-sided impacts
Internet architecture and data flow, and what the consequences of such a shift
are, in turn, for the end-users.

III. TWO-SIDED PRICING AFFECTS INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND
OPERATIONS IN MORE THAN A FINANCIAL WAY

In this section, I demonstrate how the systematic implementation of
two-sided pricing models by ISPs would drastically affect how the Internet
works. This, in turn, would have an impact on the wealth of ideas available
in the marketplace. The very logic of two-sided pricing, as applied to data
networks, is to block data, by default, from entering the receiver’s local
network, because senders of data are only incentivized to pay an end-user’s
local ISP if that ISP implements censorship by default, which can only be
lifted in exchange for payment. Two-sided pricing models, therefore, are by
definition incompatible with net neutrality. This explains why the economic
literature sometimes explicitly refers to one-sided pricing models as
“neutral” networks, and pits them against two-sided pricing models, referred
to as “non-neutral” networks.39 More broadly, two-sided pricing models, by
their very logic, are incompatible with an open Internet.

38. Figure based on the “Physical representation of Internet interconnection” by kc claffy and D.
Clark, Platform Models for Sustainable Internet Regulation, TPRC 41: THE 41ST RESEARCH
CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION AND INTERNET POLICY (2013).
39. See, e.g., John Musacchio, Galina Schwartz & Jean Walrand, A Two-Sided Market Analysis of
Provider Investment Incentives with an Application to the Net-Neutrality Issue, 8 REV. OF NETWORK
ECON., no. 1, 2009, at 23.
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Figure 3: the logic of two-sided pricing applied to data flow: senders of
contents who enter into “data pass-through” contracts with last-mile ISPs can
reach last-mile users (top flow); senders do not pay the last-mile ISPs have
their content blocked at the edge of the last-mile network (bottom flow)
There are thousands of ISPs around the world.40 It is therefore
impossible for a sender of content to have a direct relationship with them all.
As a coalition of 190 among the most celebrated of Internet engineers,
pioneers, and technologists have noted in a move to oppose the recall of net
neutrality regulation by Chairman Ajit Pai’s FCC in 2017, under a two-sided
pricing model, “[d]evelopers would have to ensure that their new application
or protocol would work under different specifications on each of the
thousands of networks that make up the Internet. Some networks might
decide to handle data differently depending on whether it represents
webpages or video. Others might decide to prioritize certain data. Such a
haphazard mishmash of different specifications and engineering conditions
would have made the growth of the Internet as we know it utterly impossible.
Instead, it would have resulted in a balkanized Internet—one in which each
ISP was its own private fiefdom, where edge providers had to negotiate with
the gatekeeper in order to get access to the end users.”41 And these comments
only referred to large, professional content producers. In an open-Internet
world where every end-user is also a sender of content, nobody can

40. No recent and specific data seems available, but as of 2014, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
estimated the total number at over 10,000, with 7,000 in the U.S. alone. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2014),
https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/WorldStats/CIA-Internet-Service-Providers-ISPs.html.
41. Joint Comments of Internet Engineers, Pioneers, and Technologists on the Technical Flaws in
the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rule-making and the Need for the Light-Touch, Bright-Line Rules from
the Open Internet Order at 32, 82 Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May 18, 2017) (to be codified at 47 CFR pt.
8 and 20), WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017), https://www.eff.org/document/internet-engineerscommentsfcc-nn.
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realistically expect that the average Internet user casually sending data to the
world in the form of emails, blog posts, or a personal web page, would have
the language skills, the legal skills, the time, or the financial resources to setup “data-pass-through” contracts with these thousands of ISPs. If all of these
ISPs implemented two-sided pricing models, then, the average sender of
content would be declined access to most of them, while a receiver would
only be able to access content created by those very few senders who have a
direct relationship with his particular last-mile ISP. Such an implementation,
then, would turn local ISPs into mere equivalents of the walled gardens of
the 1980s, à la AOL or CompuServe, where the receiver could only access
content vetted by the guardians of that community’s gate.

Figure 4: In this two-sided pricing internetworking implementation, virtual
communication between sender and receiver is denied, because the sender
does not have a direct contractual relationship with, and does not pay, the
receiver’s ISP. Each local ISP effectively acts as a gated
community/walled garden.42
So, while two-sided pricing models have “the possibility of increasing
efficiency of packet transfers over the Internet, such that more time-sensitive
packets are given prioritized access,” they “can also effectively exclude
access to non-paying firms’ content and applications.”43 To reassure the
public that small senders of content would never be shut out by the receiver’s
42. Figure based on the “Physical representation of Internet interconnection” by kc claffy and D.
Clark, Platform Models for Sustainable Internet Regulation, TPRC 41: THE 41ST RESEARCH
CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION AND INTERNET POLICY (2013).
43. Nicholas Economides & Joachim Tag, Network Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-Sided Market
Analysis, 24 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 91, 92 (2012).
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last mile ISP, ISPs have resorted to the argument of the “dirt road,” which
consists in saying that while certain high importance / high bandwidth
packets would be prioritized for the benefit of the consumer in exchange for
a fee applied to the sender, the ISPs would always leave a slow lane open for
traffic that is not bandwidth hungry, therefore not impacting at all the
average sender of content.44 In other words, fear not, all is well. This
argument is reminiscent of a scene in the infamous 1978 comedy Animal
House, where an ROTC cadet, tasked with controlling the flow of attendants
at a parade gone awry, repeatedly yells “Remain calm, all is well!!,” before
being trampled by a mad crowd.45 Indeed, suggesting that the dirt road will
ensure that all content can continue going through even when the sender has
not entered into a premium contract with the receiver’s ISP is what
Washington D.C. politicians call an “alternative fact,” as we now
demonstrate using well-established economic principles and evidence.
Starting in the mid-19th century, the economic literature on tiered
pricing has clearly shown that when multiple levels of pricing are introduced
for a good or service, the quality does not necessarily actually go up from a
base 100 level (the status quo) as the tiers of service go up; rather, service is
oftentimes actively degraded from a base 100 level (the status quo now being
called “top tier,” “premium tier,” or, in the present case, “fast lane”) to create
new, lower tiers of service. In other words, the status quo, the “old normal,”
is not now the lower tier, from which one could get a new and improved
service for a higher price; rather, the “old normal” is all of a sudden dubbed
premium, which now costs more, and service is actively degraded from that
starting place, to create “standard,” or “basic” service. Airlines have been
industrious in exploiting this pricing scheme. For example, in 2012, Delta
Airlines introduced a fourth class of service, called “Basic Economy.” Basic
Economy is the old coach class (3rd class), now made even worst by
preventing the traveler from reserving his seat number before check-in,
meaning that the traveler is more likely to get a less desirable seat, and
precluding upgrades even for travelers who would otherwise be eligible
because of their previously-acquired VIP status.46 Coach, now called “Main
44. See, e.g., Verizon’s statement: “The Commission should allow flexibility for providers to
negotiate differentiated arrangements or experiment with different service models if they see a customer
benefit in doing so, even as customers can continue to go anywhere using their selected tier for Internet
access service and edge providers can rely on that service to reach their customers without the need for
negotiating with broadband providers for access to end-users.” Reply Comments of Verizon and
Verizon Wireless, In the Matter of Framework for Broadband Internet Service, GN Docket No. 10127(Sept.
15,
2014),
https://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/09_15_14_VZ_VZW_Open_Internet_Remand_reply
_comments.pdf (emphasis added).
45. ANIMAL HOUSE (Universal Pictures 1978).
46. Delta’s New ‘E’ Basic Economy Fare – No Seat Assignments, Even For Medallions, THE
POINTS GUY (Mar. 22, 2012), https://thepointsguy.com/2012/03/deltas-new-e-basic-economy-fare-noseat-assignments-even-for-medallions/; Katie Genter, How to Survive Basic Economy on Delta Air Lines,
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Cabin,” has all of a sudden become more expensive, but not better, than it
used to be; rather, the premium which one now pays to fly coach is simply
used to maintain the old level of service and avoid having to suffer through
the inconvenience of the degraded new service class. The classical example
of such a tiered pricing system dates back to 1844 France. In the seminal
paper “On the measurement of the utility of public works,” Jules Dupuit
discusses tiered pricing strategies in French railways, at the time divided in
3 classes. He shows how “first class” is not actually a normal class which
has been improved (the improvement justifying the premium price), but,
rather, is the normal class; in turn, classes 2 and 3 are simply class 1 which
has actively been degraded. Dupuit writes:
“It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to
put a roof over the third-class carriages or to upholster the third class seats that
some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches. What the
company is trying to do is to prevent the passengers who can pay the second
class fare from traveling third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to
hurt them, but to frighten the rich. And it is again for the same reason that the
companies, having proved almost cruel to the third-class passengers and mean
to the second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class passengers.
Having refused the poor what is necessary, they give the rich what is
superfluous.”47

Still in the transportation industry, a modern iteration of this system is
provided by car manufacturer Tesla. In April 2019, the New York Times
investigated the differences between the “standard” Tesla Model 3 car,
which retailed for $35,000 and the “Standard Plus” model, which retailed for
an extra $4,500. It found that this set-up allowed “the company to produce
one version of the Model 3 and use software to limit the battery range and
turn off features such as heated seats for customers who wanted the $35,000
model.”48 In other words, Tesla did not build one car (the Standard) and
upgraded it (the Standard Plus) by physically adding more features to it. No,
it built one car in large quantities and then artificially downgraded some of
them to obtain a lesser model. Tesla itself admitted that “the ‘standard’
Model 3 was actually a software-limited version of the more expensive car…
That means the range of the [“standard”] car on a full charge is restricted, for
example, not by battery physics but by software that aims to keep it that

THE POINTS GUY (Aug. 6, 2018), https://thepointsguy.com/guide/how-to-survive-basic-economy-ondelta-air-lines/.
47. Arsène Jules Étienne Juvénal Dupuit, De la mesure de l’utilité des travaux publics, ANNALES
DES PONTS ET CHAUSSEES 8, (2d series, 1844), translated in R.H. Barback, On the measurement of the
utility of public works, 2 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PAPERS 83 (1952), reprinted in Kenneth J. Arrow
& Tibor Scitovsky, eds., READINGS IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 255 (1969).
48. Neal E. Boudette, Tesla Ends Online Sales of $35,000 Model 3, Creating New Hurdle for
Buyers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/business/tesla-model-3.html/
(emphasis added).
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way.”49 But, thanks to Tesla’s over-the-airwaves update system which can
enable or disable functionalities in one’s car remotely, one who gets the
cheaper version can always “pay the difference for a more capable version
at a later date,”50 i.e. get Tesla to press a button to un-disable existing
functions for $4,500. One now easily sees how ISPs can implement a similar
set-up, by letting customers “upgrade” to a fast lane by simply removing
artificial road blocks installed on the dirt road. In fact, evidence indicates
that this is the most likely scenario going forward, if ISPs are allowed to
implement two-sided pricing models. The information industry is already
rife with examples of what Deneckere and McAfee call “damaged goods,”51
a practice also known among marketing professionals as “crimping the
product.”52 Consider the Intel 486 SX processor, which “was initially
produced in a curious way. Intel began with a fully functioning 486 DX
processor, then disabled the math coprocessor, to produce a chip that is
strictly inferior to the 486 DX but more expensive to produce. Nevertheless,
in 1991, the 486 DX sold for $588, and the 486 SX for $333, a little over
half the price of the chip that is less expensive to produce.”53 Or consider
the IBM LaserPrinter E, a low cost alternative to the IBM LaserPrinter:
introduced in 1990, the LaserPrinter E printed 5 page-per-minute, instead of
the 10 page-per-minute for the more expensive LaserPrinter. But, as noted
by PC Magazine, the LaserPrinter E is otherwise exactly similar to the
LaserPrinter; in fact, it is the LaserPrinter, to which chips have been added
to actively slow down printing: “PC Lab’s testing of numerous evaluation
units indicated that the Laser Printer E firmware in effect insert wait states
to slow print speed…IBM has gone to some expense to slow the LaserPrinter
in firmware so that it can market it at a lower price.”54 In other words,
“throughout history and across a broad variety of different industries,
manufacturers damage some of their production solely for the purpose of
enhancing their discriminatory abilities.”55 Today, ISPs claim that being
allowed to apply two-sided pricing models combined with tiered pricing to
the Internet will lead to increased infrastructure investment on their part.56

49. Zach Wichter, Buying a Tesla Seems Pretty Easy, But There Are a Few Things to Know, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/business/buy-tesla-model-3.html/.
50. Id.
51. Raymond J. Deneckere & R. Preston McAfee, Damaged Goods, 5 J. ECON. AND MGMT.
STRATEGY 149 (1996).
52. Id. at n.1.
53. Id. at 149 (citing G. Frenkel, For Intel, A 486 Chip by Any Other Name is Still the Same, 8 PC
WK. S37(Supp. 1991)).
54. Id. at 153-154 (citing M Jones, Low Cost IBM LaserPrinter E Bears HP LaserJet IIP on
Performance and Features, 8 PC MAG. 33 (1990)).
55. Deneckere & McAfee supra note 52, at 151.
56. See generally Reply Comments of Free Press, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 82
Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May 18, 2017) (to be codified at 47 CFR pt. 8 and 20), WC Docket No. 17-108
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Such reasoning was heavily relied upon by FCC Chairman Ajit Pai in his
successful drive to repeal net neutrality.57 But the economic literature clearly
shows how the concept of paid prioritization, in a two-sided-pricing Internet
model, instead of incentivizing ISPs to upgrade existing networks to create
fast toll roads (the so-called fast lanes), actually reduces the incentive of ISPs
to upgrade networks, and instead provides ISPs with an incentive “to create
artificial congestion in the ‘slow lane.’”58 ISPs own behavior seems to
corroborate economic theory: their investments in wireline broadband
infrastructure have actually decreased since the 2015 Open Internet Order
was repealed in 2017. In contrast, they had increased in the 2015-2017
period, even though ISPs had warned that net neutrality regulations would
lead to a decrease in investment.59
It is also worth noting that if ISPs continuously improved all three lanes,
the slow lanes would theoretically become good enough that users would not
have an incentive to pay for the fast lane anymore. So, just like the French
train companies in 1844, or Delta Airlines or Tesla automobiles in 2019,
ISPs instead need to scare customers in order to capture revenue from users
able to pay a higher price. ISPs’ incentive is to create a slow lane, not by
making the fast lane faster, but by artificially congesting the regular lane, the
degraded result now aptly named “dirt road.” This is no different than Tesla
degrading its Model 3 by artificially lowering its top speed with the help of
a piece of software to extract an extra $4,500 from customers willing to pay
that extra to get the “fast Tesla,” which actually is the base, unmodified
Model 3. That the ISP’s fast lane would likely be the regular lane, and the
“dirt road” the regular lane artificially congested through software

(2017),
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10831280772298/Free%20Press%2017108%20Reply%20Comments.pdf (discussing ISP’s claims).
57. See generally Restoring Internet Freedom Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,568,
25,570 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 8, 20), WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-restoring-internet-freedom-order/ (discussing how Pai’s
FCC in fact went suggested that the 2015 Open Internet Order “has put at risk online investment an
innovation, threatening the very open Internet it purported to preserve.”).
58. Nicholas Economides, Why Imposing New Tolls on Third-Party Content and Applications
Threatens Innovation and will not Improve Broadband Providers’ Investment, in NET NEUTRALITY:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEBATE 86, 94, 99 (Jorge Perez Martinez ed., 2010).
59. Cory Doctorow, After Net Neutrality Repeal, Comcast, Charter and Verizon Cut Investment in
Their Networks, BOINGBOING (Jan. 23, 2019), https://boingboing.net/2019/01/23/3pct-lower-in-18.html;
Cory Doctorow, New York Attorney General Expands Law-Enforcement Investigation into the Bots that
Killed Network Neutrality, BOINGBOING (Oct. 17, 2018), https://boingboing.net/2018/10/17/fcc-v-nyag.html; Comcast Reports 4th Quarter and Full Year 2018 Results, COMCAST (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://www.cmcsa.com/news-releases/news-release-details/comcast-reports-4th-quarter-and-full-year2018-results; Jon Brodkin, Sorry, Ajit: Comcast Lowered Cable Investment Despite Net Neutrality
Repeal, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 23, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/01/sorryajit-comcast-lowered-cable-investment-despite-net-neutrality-repeal/; Reply Comments of Free Press at
86-208, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May 18, 2017) (to be
codified at 47 CFR pt. 8 and 20) (Aug. 30, 2017), WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017),
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10831280772298/Free%20Press%2017-108%20Reply%20Comments.pdf.

Winter 2021

FOR AN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT FOR CYBERSPACE

61

intervention, is not mere speculation. Not only is it supported by economic
theory as we have just observed, but ISPs have at times been explicit about
such strategy.60 For example, Bill Smith, Chief Technology Officer for
BellSouth, stated that “his company should be allowed to charge a rival
voice-over-Internet firm so that its service can operate with the same quality
as BellSouth’s offering.”61 In other words, pay a premium to get the same
quality as before, or get your bits slowed down. James Boyle offers a witty
analogy for such a process of discrimination “between favored and
disfavored content, giving the former preferential access;” it would be akin
“to letting the phone company say, ‘we will delay your call to Pizza Hut for
sixty seconds, but if you want to be put through our featured pizza provider
immediately, hit nine now!’” 62 Jon Peha, noting that “[e]quipment is already
being deployed to degrade [quality of service] for this purpose,” provides a
data-based in-depth discussion of technical variations around this broad
theme,63 and provides examples where a service that is sufficiently degraded
cannot in practice compete with others even where the data is not fully
blocked.64 As if this was not enough, one more crucial issue with such an
incentive system is that unlike actual freeways where cars will always end
up getting to their destination, even if it takes longer than the driver wishes
for, in data transmission, when a network (a road) becomes too congested
(slow), packets “drop,” that is, get discarded.65 This can lead to “‘congestion

60. Dawn Nunziato , VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE INTERNET
AGE 11 (2009)(emphasis added)(“[S]everal broadband providers have … publicly expressed their
intentions to sell preferential Internet access speed to the highest bidder, or to reserve the same for their
own (or affiliated) content, and to (respectively) degrade Internet access for those unwilling to pay for
this privilege”).
61. Internet Freedom and Innovation at Risk: Why Congress Must Restore Strong Net Neutrality
Protection, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/Internet-freedom-and-innovation-risk-why-congressmust-restore-strong-net-neutrality (last visited Sep. 25, 2021); see also Jon Brodkin, Comcast Deleted
Net Neutrality Pledge the Same Day FCC Announced Repeal, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/11/comcast-deleted-net-neutrality-pledge-the-same-day-fccannounced-repeal/ (Comcast deleted its previous “no-paid-prioritization pledge” on the same day FCC
Chairman Ajit Pai announced its plan to repeal net neutrality rules, and Comcast has subsequently use
subtle rhetoric to dance around the idea of introducing paid-prioritization).
62. JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 235 (2008).
63. John M. Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and the Quest for a
Balanced Policy, at the 34TH TELECOMM. POL’Y RSCH. CONF. 9-10 (Sep. 2006) (emphasis added).,
http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~peha/balanced_net_neutrality_policy.pdf .
64. See, e.g., id. at 9 (“It is relatively simple to degrade quality of service of VOIP to the point that
it cannot seriously compete with traditional telephony.”).
65. See, e.g., Steven Bauer, David D. Clark & William Lehr, The Evolution of Internet Congestion,
at the TELECOMM. POL’Y RSCH. CONF. 9 (Aug. 15, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1999830 (discussion
of the “networking text book definition,” according to which congestion is a “situation in which a switch
or router has so many packets queued for transmission that it runs out of buffer space and must start
dropping packets if more arrive”); see also Joint Comments of Internet Engineers, Pioneers, and
Technologists on the Technical Flaws in the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rule-making and the Need for
the Light-Touch, Bright-Line Rules from the Open Internet Order at 6, 82 Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May
18, 2017) (to be codified at 47 CFR pt. 8 and 20), WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017),
https://www.eff.org/document/internet-engineers-commentsfcc-nn.
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collapse’ i.e. periods of time when the network [is] busy sending packets
but most of the packets [are] duplicates of previous packets that had
already been sent” and dropped along the way.66 In practice, this means that
if the slow lane is slow enough to create enough congestion, the content
never reaches its destination, and the sender is left resending the same packet
over and over again, to no avail because the packets keep getting dropped.
In practice, such effect is similar to being blocked.
Because the poor are less likely to be able to pay the premium to get the
base service, small content producers are more likely to be blocked than large
corporate players. This causes an issue when it comes to the Internet’s
contribution to the marketplace of ideas, both in terms of sheer volume of
information being able to pass through, and in terms of plurality of views.
We will return to this problem in Parts IV and V. For now, let us examine
through historical examples what happens to the ability of users to access
content, and the ability of independent content and service providers to
distribute their creations, when barriers are erected around last-mile
networks, which is what would happen if two-sided pricing schemes were
implemented by last-mile ISPs.

IV. BACK TO THE 80S: TWO-SIDED PRICING TURNS THE INTERNET
INTO A SERIES OF WALLED GARDENS

Commercial online systems, in the 1980s United States, were organized
as “walled gardens” (also known as “gated communities”), a series of closed
platform ecosystems, where users could only access the content offered by
that walled garden. The three main walled gardens were AOL, CompuServe,
and Prodigy.67 This organization mirrored early time-sharing systems used
at universities, where a researcher at Berkeley could only use the Berkeley
computer, the researcher at MIT the MIT computer, etc. Bob Taylor, who
in 1966 headed the Information Processing Techniques Office at the
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), remembers that to access
time sharing computers in Santa Monica, Berkeley, and MIT, from his office
in the Pentagon, he needed three different terminals, and three different sets
of user commands. As a reaction, “I said, oh, man, it’s obvious what to do:
If you have these three terminals, there ought to be one terminal that goes
anywhere you want to go where you have interactive computing. That idea
is the ARPAnet.”68

66. Bauer, Clark & Lehr, supra note 65, at 22.
67. AOL’s
Walled
Gardens,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Sept.
4,
2000),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB968104011203980910?mg=prod/com-wsj.
68. John Markoff, An Internet Pioneer Ponders the Next Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 1999),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/12/biztech/articles/122099outlookbobb.html.
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This idea was further developed by Taylor with his ARPA predecessor
J.C.R. Licklider, known in particular for his “Galactic Network” concept, “a
globally interconnected set of computers through which everyone could
quickly access data and programs from any site.”69 Together, they worked
on creating a networked “supercommunity,” 70 in other words, a network of
networks: “you don’t have to be half smart to see this thing ought to be
designed such that you have just one terminal and you can go wherever you
want to go.”71 These ideas, which many others in the US and elsewhere
contributed to shaping, are the foundations of the open Internet. As a result,
and from a practical standpoint, in an open Internet, “[t]he typical contract
of an Internet service provider (ISP) with a customer gives the customer
access to the whole Internet through a physical or virtual pipe of a certain
bandwidth.”72 This is what enables virtual communication between senders
and receivers of content connected locally via separate ISPs, as we have just
discussed in the first two sections. From a pricing and contractual standpoint,
this exchange of data across separate, interconnected networks is possible
because each last-mile ISP implements a one-sided pricing model, and does
not charge outside senders of content or impose on them contractual terms
before they let the outside content enter their local network. In contrast, an
Internet subject to a two-sided pricing model only gives the local ISP’s
customer access to whatever content that ISP has decided to let into its
network. The results of this “enclosure movement of the mind,” to borrow
from James Boyle,73 is to turn the once-open network of networks into
something akin to the non-interconnected walled gardens of the 1980s, and,
therefore, radically changes the nature of the Internet and what users can do
with it. Indeed, “[t]he way the Internet has operated so far [was itself] a
radical departure from the operating principles of the traditional digital
electronic networks predating it, such as CompuServe, Prodigy, AOL, AT&
T Mail, MCI Mail and others. These older electronic networks were
centralized with very little functionality allowed at the edge of the
network.”74 In fact, “ISPs like AOL, Compuserve, or Prodigy differentiated
themselves based on the different information services each provided—
services like chat rooms, bulletin board systems, email, and specialized

69. Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel
C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts & Stephen Wolff, BRIEF HIST. INTERNET (1997),
https://www.Internetsociety.org/Internet/history-Internet/brief-history-Internet/.
70. J.C.R. Licklider & Robert W. Taylor, The Computer as a Communication Device, SCI. AND
TECH. 21, 32 (1968).
71. Leslie Berlin, TROUBLEMAKERS 49 (2017) (citing interview by John Markoff, Senior Writer,
N.Y. Times, with Bob Taylor (Dec. 8, 2008)).
72. Nicholas Economides & Joachim Tag, Network Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-Sided Market
Analysis, 24 INFO. ECON. AND POL’Y 91 (2012).
73. JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN xii (2008).
74. Economides & Tag, supra note 72, at 92.
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content only available to an ISP’s own subscribers. In other words, ISPs
competed on what information services they actually provided
themselves.”75 Let us delve into the historical record to appreciate the
practical import of this last observation for the flow of ideas.
Most online access providers in the US in the 1980s implemented not
just time-based but also content-based price discrimination schemes on the
receiver-side of the market. That is, they made the receiver pay differently
for different types of content, in what can be considered an early form of
zero-rating. For example, Esther Dyson’s leading industry newsletter
Release 1.0 reported in 1993 that America Online (AOL) was one of the few
providers “left that haven’t created a two-tier price structure, separating
services such as email or airline reservations from others.”76 In contrast,
while Prodigy had historically provided its service on a flat-fee model
(except for email), in July 1993, it was to “institute hourly charges (after two
cumulative free hours) for bulletin boards, Easy Sabre, Dow Jones News
Retrieval and stock quotes.”77 This is not different from zero-rating models,
where certain content is treated preferentially by the network operator on the
user side of the market (for example, T-Mobile treats Spotify better than
other music services such as Pandora by not counting the use of that service
towards the end-user’s data cap, and Facebook launched a mobile Internet
service in India that zero-rated… Facebook, until the practice got banned by
the local regulator).78 But what made these systems so different from the
open Internet was not so much the treatment of the receiver of content, but,
rather, the discrimination they implemented on the content-provider side of
the market. Content accessible to customers was curated by the platform
operator, without due process, and with business considerations dominating
considerations of user interest. This led to a paucity of content for users. For
example “Prodigy has no chat feature, partly because its network is

75. Joint Comments of Internet Engineers, Pioneers, and Technologists on the Technical Flaws in
the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rule-making and the Need for the Light-Touch, Bright-Line Rules from
the Open Internet Order at 22, 82 Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May 18, 2017) (to be codified at 47 CFR pt.
8, 20), WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017), https://www.eff.org/document/internet-engineers-commentsfccnn; see also CARL SHAPIRO AND HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 186-187(1999).
76. Jerry Michalski, Community, Part I, RELEASE 1.0, June 21, 1993, at 16.
77. Id. at 14.
78. Unlimited video streaming with Binge On, T-MOBILE, https://www.t-mobile.com/offers/bingeon-streaming-video (last visited Sept. 29, 2021); James Vincent, Facebook’s Free Basics Service has
Been Banned in India, THE VERGE (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/2/8/10913398/freebasics-india-regulator-ruling; see generally Devin Coldewey, WTF is zero rating?, TECHCRUNCH (Apr.
16, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/16/wtf-is-zero-rating (reviewing issues raised by zero rating);
see also Corynne McSherry, Jeremy Malcolm, & Kit Walsh, Zero Rating: What It Is and Why You Should
Care,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION
(Feb.
18,
2016),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/zero-rating-what-it-is-why-you-should-care; Davide Banis, How
‘Zero-Rating’ Offers Threaten Net-Neutrality In The Developing World, F ORBES (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidebanis/2019/02/18/how-zero-rating-offers-threaten-net-neutrality-inthe-developing-world/#75f4ac083b41 (reviewing issues raised by zero rating in the developing world).
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centralized, partly because of its policy of censoring content: Every message
goes through a software filter; borderline postings are reviewed by staff, who
return offensive ones to their originators.”79 Community Link Minitel, a
joint venture of France Telecom and US West, did provide users access to
the services available on the French Minitel network, under one caveat: “US
West censors [the “rose” (adult) services] before they reach the US
audience.”80 Likewise, 101 Online, another attempt by France Telecom to
market Minitel in the US, implemented a system where the third-party
content providers had to bring their content, on a floppy disk, to a downtown
San Francisco office where 101 Online would upload said content on their
mainframe. This was one of the reasons that led to a paucity of content on
that platform, which in turn led to a paucity of users. As Alan Lundell, editor
of Byte Magazine and Mondo 2000, would later put it, “I didn’t know anyone
using it.”81 This historical fact is what led the Internet Engineers, Pioneers,
and Technologists to comment that absent net neutrality regulations, “the
result could be a disastrous decrease in the overall value of the Internet82…If
ISPs could engage in this sort of blocking, throttling, and interference …, it
would transform the Internet from a permission-less environment (in which
anyone can develop a new app or protocol and deploy it confident that the
Internet treats all traffic equally) into one in which developers would first
need to seek approval from or pay fees to ISPs before deploying their latest
groundbreaking technology. Developers and engineers would no longer be
able to depend on the core assumption that the Internet will treat all data
equally. The sort of rapid innovation the Internet has fueled for the past two
decades would come to a sudden and disastrous halt.” 83 Let us again
consider the situation of non-neutral retail online services in the U.S. in the
1980s. The Source, a Readers’ Digest subsidiary, based its selection of
curated content “based on likely long-term usage rates, as opposed to
‘attention –getter qualities.’ This relatively new policy,” an industry report
noted in 1983, “has led to decisions to drop a number of previously
anticipated new products, such as an electronic encyclopedia.”84 Likewise,
in 1983, the online version of the twenty-volume World Book Encyclopedia

79. Michalski, supra note 76, at 15.
80. Id. at 11.
81. Julien Mailland, 101 Online: American Minitel Network and Lessons from its Failure, 38 IEEE
ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING 6, 8-9 (2016).
82. Joint Comments of Internet Engineers, Pioneers, and Technologists on the Technical Flaws in
the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rule-making and the Need for the Light-Touch, Bright-Line Rules from
the Open Internet Order at 43, 82 Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May 18, 2017) (to be codified at 47 CFR pt.
8, 20), WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017), https://www.eff.org/document/internet-engineers-commentsfccnn.
83. Id. at 33.
84. ROBERT E. WIDING II & W. WAYNE TALARZYK, ONLINE COMPUT. LIBR. CTR. INC, VIDEOTEX
PROJECT REVIEWS II. 75 (Oct. 28, 1983).
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was removed from the walled garden and replaced with the Grolier electronic
encyclopedia. Overnight, CompuServe users lost access to the World Book
content.85 The result of these policies of restricting the inflow of content
onto these platforms was a paucity of content, and, mechanically, a lack of
value for users. This disincentivized users from subscribing to online
services. Good data are not available for retail online penetration in the
United States in the 1980s and 1990s, mostly because they are self-reported,
but a variety of estimates can be recouped.86 In 1991, a U.S. Bureau of
Census study on computer use in the United States for 1989 did not even
mention online activities.87 Still in 1991, Al Gore suggested that “services
like Prodigy, Genie and CompuServe are now in use in almost half a million
homes,”88 meaning roughly half of one percent of the population in a country
of then-93 million households.89 In 1993, Esther Dyson estimated that “some
3 million people are already paying to be in virtual piazzas such as
CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online,” meaning roughly 1.15% of a
population of then-260 million.90 In contrast, Dyson continued, “at 6 million
low-rent terminals in use … [the French Minitel networks] dwarfs the
commercial online services.”91 Note the difference in scale: in 1993, the 6M
French terminals (most of which were shared in households or workplaces)
served a population of 59M, whereas the 3M U.S. users are out of a
population of 260M, that same year.92 One of the keys to Minitel’s success
was that the network was not a walled garden. Instead, it was relatively open.
Although there were some administrative hurdles to jump that did create
some barriers to entry and some chilling effects on speech, in practice,
anyone determined to do so could attach a server to the network and provide
lawful content. When the service provider (France Telecom) pulled the plug

85. Id. at 21.
86. See Kevin Driscoll, Demography and Decentralization: Measuring the Bulletin Board Systems
of North America, 23 WIDERSCREEN 2 (2020) (discussing challenges of measuring the penetration of
online services); see also JULIEN MAILLAND & KEVIN DRISCOLL, MINITEL: WELCOME TO THE INTERNET
9-13 (2017).
87. Robert Kominski, U.S. DEP’T COM., Computer Use in the United States: 1989 (1991),
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/1991/demographics/p23-171.pdf.
88. Al Gore, Infrastructure for the Global Village, 265 SCI. AM. 108, 111 (Sept. 1991).
89. Kominski, supra note 88, at 2.
90. Jerry Michalski, Community, Part I, RELEASE 1.0, June 21, 1993, at 4.
91. Id.
92. Compare INSEE, FRANCE, DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS, Google Public Data Explorer,
https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=z7ebrb577a0414_&ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nsel
m=h&met_y=population&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country&idim=country:FR&ifdim=country
&tstart=402044400000&tend=1569654000000&ind=false (last visited Sept. 29, 2021) (French
terminals, most of which were shared in households or workplaces, served a population of 59M in 1993),
with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Population in the US, Google Public Data Explorer,
https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=kf7tgg1uo9ude_&ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm
=h&met_y=population&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country&idim=country:US&ifdim=country&
tstart=622969200000&tend=938502000000&ind=false (last updated Apr. 3, 2020) (The U.S. users made
up 3M of a 260M population in 1993).
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on certain services based on allegations of illegal content being provided,
such decision could be challenged through administrative and judicial
institutions. Indeed, for French policymakers, it was clear from the start that
the creation of content over the Minitel network would not reach critical
mass if the access provider (in this case, the state-run telephone company)
imposed restrictions on potential senders of content through personality,
financial, or content-based contractual restrictions. In one formulation
drafted by the prime minister’s office in 1980, the “neutrality of the public
service of communications” means that “freedom of access to the profession
of online publisher is the rule, which conversely means that that any
restrictions [imposed at this level] … would be illegal;” that “there is no legal
basis upon which [the network operator] could impose … [rules] related to
the content of the data being transmitted;” and that “[t]o ensure neutrality of
the public service of telecommunications, it is necessary that the [content
providers] be in an objective situation vis a vis [the network operator], as
defined by a law or regulation and not through a contract between the
[content providers] and [the network operator]. Likewise, the [network
operator] will be responsible to ensure the freedom … of relationships
between the user and the information provider.”93 In other words, in this
early European version, network neutrality means that the network access
provider (the equivalent of today’s ISP) could not interfere with the
communication between the receiver and the content provider, and could not
restrict access to the network to content providers based on the content being
transmitted or through contractual arrangements.94 Although some easilycircumventable restrictions were eventually put in place to appease a
fledging press industry as to who could transmit content over the network,
by and large, Minitel was open to any content provider, and the access
service provider did not discriminate between content providers, neither
based on content, not on ability to pay. As a result, a relatively uncensored
Minitel quickly reached critical mass, entered a positive feedback look, and
afforded its users with access to over 25,000 services at its peak in the midnineties,95 making France then the world’s most wired country.96 In contrast,
referring to the state of the retail online market in the US, Al Gore noted in
1991 that there were “valid worries that existing laws do not adequately

93. F. Froment Meurice, Principes Généraux Applicables au Videotex: Premiers Eléments,
PREMIER MINISTRE : SECRETARIAT GENERAL DU GOUVERNMENT (June 30, 1980) (FR) (underline in
original) (italics added).
94. Julien Mailland, Building Internet Policy on History: Lessons of the Forgotten 1981 Network
Neutrality Debate, 2 INTERNET HIST. 6 (2018) (showing that the oft-repeated urban legend that Tim Wu
invented net neutrality is factually incorrect).
95. JULIEN MAILLAND & KEVIN DRISCOLL, MINITEL: WELCOME TO THE INTERNET 13-14 (2017).
96. JAMES GILLIES & ROBERT CAILLIAU, HOW THE WEB WAS BORN 111 (2000).
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protect the rights and liberties of computer users to express themselves in the
new medium.” 97
Another factor that limited the availability of content on online platforms
in the United States in the 1980s and early 1990s was not just that they were
censored, walled gardens, but that they were by and large not connected to
each other. So, a CompuServe subscriber could not get access to the content
available on the AOL platform (let they subscribe to both services), and
could only get access to content that had received a prior stamp of approval
by CompuServe. A subscription to one of these gated communities gave the
user access to the content available within that particular walled garden only.
This led to a balkanized market (it was estimated that over 100 ventures
competed in 1986)98 and a paucity of online content within each individual
platform. As a result, online penetration in the US was lagging behind
countries such as France, where a universal and rather open and neutral
platform made the country the most wired in the world.99 Al Gore
recognized the cause of the problem (censored, non-interconnected walled
gardens), and stressed the importance of the free flow of information for the
US: “[r]epresentative democracy relies on the still revolutionary assumption
that the best way for a nation to make political decisions is for all its citizens
to process the information relevant to their lives and to express their
conclusions in free speech and in votes that are combined with those of
millions of others to guide the system as a whole. Communism, by contrast,
attempted to bring all the information to a large and powerful central
processor, which collapsed when it was overwhelmed by even more complex
information.”100
Critiquing corporate censorship and the lack of
interconnection of online platforms, and speaking of the need for a general
purpose, open, national network, he continued: “Without federal funding for
this national network, we would end up with a balkanized system, consisting
of incompatible parts. The strength of the national network is that it will not
be controlled or run by a single entity. Hundreds of different players will be
able to connect their own networks to this one… It will be up to federal and
state policy makers to determine how best to build a universal, high-speed
network, to reconcile the competing corporate interests and to create a
network that maximizes the benefits enjoyed by all Americans… Adequate
federal investment and leadership will give us the power to leverage the

97. Al Gore, Infrastructure for the Global Village, 265 SCI. AM. 108 (Sept. 1991).
98. JEROME AUMENTE, NEW ELECTRONIC PATHWAYS: VIDEOTEX, TELETEXT, AND ONLINE
DATABASES 44-74 (1987); Christopher Sterling, Pioneering Risk: Lessons from the US Teletext/Videotex
Failure, 28 IEEE ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING 41, 42 (2006); see also A Virtual Counter-Revolution,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 2010, at 75.
99. GILLIES & CAILLIAU, supra note 96.
100. Gore, supra note 97.
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millions of dollars into something greater than the sum of its parts.”101 Al
Gore understood that interconnection and openness would create network
effects that would increase the value of going online for users because
availability of information would be maximized. Indeed, as noted by the
Internet Engineers, Pioneers, and Technologists, it is that “openness and
neutrality that have contributed to the Internet’s explosive growth over the
past several decades.”102 As the Internet became privatized under the open
and neutral framework theorized by Gore, users flocked the open Internet
and abandoned their walled gardens.103 The companies that operated walled
gardens for the retail market and that nevertheless survived past 1995 were
those, notably AOL and CompuServe, that opened their gates and switched
their business model to providing access to the open Internet.104 In doing so,
they enabled their users to benefit from the explosion of creation and content
linked to the open nature of the Internet.105 Vint Cerf concurs with Gore:
“you want to adopt rules that will allow for innovative, new uses of the net
to come about. You wouldn’t want to have a rule which says that the tel-cos
[telecommunications companies] can decide what applications you’re
allowed to put up on the net. I like this permission-less network idea, which
has allowed companies like Amazon and eBay and Google and Yahoo and
Skype and others, to exist, as opposed to somebody trying to decide which
ones should be allowed on . . .. . . I would say that the walled garden notions
of AOL, for example, are clear instances of attempts to control content and
access and to bring people into a place where they only see what you want
them to see. And the general public has said, ‘We don’t want that.’ The
trouble here is that a privatized network can’t create—— it cannot keep up
with the creativity of the open net. That’s really the issue..” 106 Cerf

101. Id. at 111.
102. Joint Comments of Internet Engineers, Pioneers, and Technologists on the Technical Flaws in
the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rule-making and the Need for the Light-Touch, Bright-Line Rules from
the Open Internet Order at 31, 82 Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May 18, 2017) (to be codified at 47 CFR pt.
8, 20), WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017), https://www.eff.org/document/internet-engineers-commentsfccnn.
103. In fact, Minitel use started collapsing at about the same time, both because it was more
expensive than the Internet, but also because access to a now-worldwide network of networks made
available a lot more content to users than a domestic, albeit relatively open, network.
104. Consider this 1995 AOL commercial, which, while touting the content of AOL’s walled garden
to do things such as researching dinosaurs for your kid’s class presentation, ordering flowers for your
mom, or researching the stock market, also pitches some open-Internet interconnection features: “you
know, I can even send email on the Internet!” says one character to the other. mycommercials, Early
AOL Commercial (1995), YOUTUBE (Nov. 16, 2009), https://youtu.be/1npzZu83AfU?t=93.
105. See, e.g., MONICA HORTEN, THE CLOSING OF THE NET 9 (2016) (“The Internet was a generalpurpose network open to all . . . . Its open character led to an explosion in innovation and in content,
which in turn is why the openness is considered to be worth protecting as something that has an intrinsic
public-interest value.”).
106. Donald Nielson, Oral History of Vinton (Vint) Cerf, COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM, Nov. 7,
2007, at 37-38, CHM Lot No. X4308.2008.
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concluded that “the walled garden notion has disintegrated.”107
Unfortunately, that notion is back, and is at the heart of two-sided pricing
models. As demonstrated in Part II, two-sided pricing models can only be
implemented if the last-mile is, by default, a walled garden that blocks
outside content and whose door will open only in exchange for payment or
another discrimination mechanism. The enclosure necessary to make twosided pricing models viable for ISPs in an Internetworking context, that is, a
system where local ISPs block or throttle incoming content by default in
order to incentivize outside content providers to pay them a fee to get on the
fast lane, does reverse the trend towards openness and has the potential to
take us back to the 1980s.108
This enclosure of online worlds is detrimental to large corporate content
and service providers such as Netflix. But Netflix, with its 229 billion dollars
market cap (as of August 2021), can afford paying a toll to a myriad of lastmile ISPs, and can afford the lawyers necessary to negotiate such agreements
or bring lawsuits against oligopolistic ISPs for wrongdoing. Smaller, for
profit, content providers, in contrast, have been raising red flags. Etsy, for
example, has warned that “[w]e have a small legal team of just four
attorneys, none of whom are experts in telecommunications law. To bring a
case, we would have to spend considerable money on outside counsel to
advise us on the merits of our complaint and marshal expert witnesses. . .. . .
Meanwhile, if we chose to proceed, we would be up against the broadband
providers’ expert lawyers and unfathomably deep pockets.”109 If Etsy, with
its 23 billion dollars market cap (as of July 2021) and its “team of just four
attorneys,” is indeed at risk of being shut out of the marketplace by the
implementation of two-sided pricing models, it is not hard to imagine the
impact of such models on small, not-for-profit content providers, including
end-users, who actually cannot afford to pay either a toll or the lawyers
needed to negotiate such toll agreements, and whose packets are at
significant risk of being dropped from the dirt road.110 These end-users are
107. Id. at 38.
108. See, e.g., HORTEN, supra note 105, at 71 (“[N]et neutrality is concerned with interference with
Internet traffic and restrictive practices by network operators which have negative externalities.”).
109. Comments of Etsy, Inc., In the Matter of Open Internet Remand (July 8, 2014), 81 Fed. Reg.
3967;
Preserving
the
Open
Internet,
25
FCC
Rcd.
1834
(3),
https://blog.etsy.com/news/files/2014/07/Etsy-Open-Internet-Comments-7.8.14.pdf.
110. See April Glaser, Comcast Wants You to Think It Supports Net Neutrality While It Pushes for
Net Neutrality to Be Destroyed, SLATE (Nov. 28, 2017), https://slate.com/technology/2017/11/comcastwants-you-to-think-it-supports-net-neutrality-while-it-pushes-for-net-neutrality-to-be-destroyed.html
(With respect to Comcast’s position on paid-prioritization, “Comcast’s line has changed in an important
way. In a comment to the FCC from earlier this year, the company said it is time for the FCC to adopt a
‘more flexible’ approach to paid prioritization, and noted in a blog post at the time that the FCC should
consider net neutrality principles that prevent ‘no anticompetitive paid prioritization.’ In other words, not
necessarily all paid prioritization. The inclusion of ‘anti-competitive’ could signal that the company does
in fact hope to offer fast-lane service, but at the same price for all. And it might be a price that say, Fox
News and the New York Times can afford, but one that smaller outlets can’t.”) (emphasis added).
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no less content providers than Netflix and Etsy. As the U.S. Supreme Court
noted as early as 1997 in Reno v. ACLU, “[f]rom the publishers’ point of
view, [the open Internet] constitutes a vast platform from which to address
and hear from a worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers,
researchers, and buyers. Any person or organization with a computer
connected to the Internet can “publish” information. Publishers include
government agencies, educational institutions, commercial entities,
advocacy groups, and individuals.”111 Notice how “commercial entities” and
“buyers” are only one element in the Supreme Court’s analysis, and how the
Court focuses on the Internet’s role as an electronic marketplace of ideas. In
this context, I will now argue, the FCC made a mistake in opposing “users”
to “edge-providers” in the 2010, 2015, and 2017 Orders, because this
opposition reduces the Internet to a commercial marketplace for goods and
services, and eludes the historic role of the network of networks as a
marketplace of ideas.112 This risk is exacerbated by the fact that a significant
part of the rhetoric around Internet policy in the past twenty years has
revolved around for-profit uses of the Internet. In the next section, I refocus
the policy debate on “the little guys,” users/content creators who use the open
network of network a as an electronic soap box.

V. WE HAVE LOST SIGHT OF THE ELECTRONIC SOAP BOX
When and how the shift in rhetoric happened deserves a study onto
itself. But one can already trace a key inflection point at the privatization of
the Internet in 1995 and the short-lived, yet incredibly disruptive and fruitful
dot.com era. The “Internet” the Supreme Court described in Reno was what
Lawrence Lessig called “Net 95,” a short window of time when “[a]ccess
was open and universal, not conditioned upon credentials. It was, in a narrow
sense of the term, an extraordinary democratic moment. Users were
fundamentally equal. Essentially free.”113 With the dot.com era comes the
tale of the Internet as a new frontier for the maverick entrepreneur. The hero
is no longer a user who creates a web page to share his knowledge, or her
political insights, with the world, but a hot head who homesteads on the new
frontier to both change the world and make money doing so. That new

111. Reno v. Am. C.L. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
112. See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 1834 (3) (2010),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-10-201A1.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Order]; see Protecting and
Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (7) (2015), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR2015-04-13/pdf/2015-07841.pdf [hereinafter 2015 Order]; see Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd.
311
(1)
(2017),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-restoring-internet-freedom-order
[hereinafter 2017 Order].
113. Lawrence Lessig, The Laws of Cyberspace presented at the Taiwan Net ‘98 conference 7 (Mar.
1998) (transcript available at https://cyber.harvard.edu/works/lessig/laws_cyberspace.pdf).
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rhetoric was captured with gusto by Po Bronson, in his Silicon-Valleyculture masterpiece The Nudist on the Late Shift:
BY CAR, BY PLANE, THEY COME. They just show up. They’ve given up their
lives elsewhere to come here. They come for the tremendous opportunity,
believing that in no other place in the world right now can one person
accomplish so much with talent, initiative, and a good idea. It’s a region
where who you know and how much money you have have never been less
relevant to success. They come because it does not matter that they are young
or left college without a degree or have dark skin or speak with an accent.
They come even if it is illegal to do so. They come because they feel that they
will regret it the rest of their lives if they do not at least give it a try. They
come to be a part of history, to build the technology that will reshape how
people will live and work five or ten years from now. They come for the
excitement, just to be a part of it. They come because they are competitive by
instinct and can’t stand to see others succeed more than they. They come to
make enough money so they will never have to think about money again.
They are the new breed, Venture Trippers, who get off on the dizzying
adventure of bloodwork. It is a mad, fertile time. Working has become nothing
less than a sport here in Superachieverland: people are motivated by the thrill
of the competition and the danger of losing, and every year the rules evolve to
make it all happen more quickly, on higher margins, reaching ever more
amazing sums.
And rather than choosing not to work hard, the Venture Trippers are taking
the opposite approach from the Slackers. They’re saying, If I’m going to have
to make that trade-off, then hell, why the fuck not? I’m young, let’s raise the
stakes. Let’s up the bet. Let’s make it exciting. Let’s put it all on black. Let ‘em
roll.114

In this context, the average Internet user is no longer an active participant in
“a vast platform from which to address and hear from a worldwide audience
of millions” (Reno).115 Instead, roles revert to a traditional professionalmedia-world dichotomy: content creators on one hand driven by profit, and
receivers on the other, passive, mere pairs of eyeballs sitting on their couches
at the confines of networks, receiving content pre-packaged by the new
heroes of the Internet, the Venture Trippers. It is not surprising then, given
this rhetorical shift, that when in 2004, FCC Chairman Powell laid out its
Guiding Principles for the Industry for Preserving Internet Freedom, and
paid lip service to the little guy in a heading that on its face sounded almost
like a manifesto for a socialist revolution (Achieving the Vision: Power to
the People), he concomitantly reduced the empowering nature of the Internet
to “consumer empowerment.” Those who do not create financial value on

114. PO BRONSON, THE NUDIST OF THE LATE SHIFT 1 (1999).
115. Reno, 521 U.S. at 111.
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the networks are no longer recognized as content creators at all, they are now
mere consumers of the commercial content created by others:
We must ensure that the various capabilities of these technologies are not used
in a way that could stunt the growth of the economy, innovation and consumer
empowerment. . .. . . Broadband networks are impressive generators of
economic growth, innovation and empowerment. But generators don’t work
unless they have fuel to burn. Broadband networks are fueled by consumers’
hunger for an ever-expanding array of high-value content, applications and
devices that run over these networks. Easy access to this content and
technology is bringing more power to the people. . .. . . the possibilities for
consumer empowerment extend beyond devices. These possibilities arise from
the Internet’s open architecture, which allows consumers to freely interact
with anyone around the globe. Musicians and writers, who could never have
landed a contract with a major record label or publisher, can find - or create
- audiences for their work. Small town radio stations can reach people who
have moved to the big city. E-Bay is another good example: gone are the days
when each of us had only a small group of potential buyers for what we think
is junk in our garages. Somewhere, in the next state or the next continent, there
are people who may very well want to buy that “junk” and pay us more than
we ever dreamed for it. The open Internet has opened markets beyond the
traditional geographic limitations.116

The FCC came full circle in the 2010 Open Internet Order (“the 2010
Order”).117 Where the Reno court had placed commerce last in its analysis
of what the Internet marketplace supported (“[f]rom the publishers’ point of
view, [the open Internet] constitutes a vast platform from which to address
and hear from a worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers,
researchers, and buyers”),118 the 2010 Order places it first (“Today the
Commission takes an important step to preserve the Internet as an open
platform for innovation, investment, job creation, economic growth,
competition, and free expression.”)119 Where the Reno user was considered
a full fledge publisher, the 2010 FCC’s user is a mere consumer. Where the
Reno court considered the Internet to be a marketplace of ideas, the 2010
FCC characterizes it mostly as a marketplace for commerce: “Each round of
innovation increases the value of the Internet for broadband providers, edge
providers, online businesses, and consumers. Continued operation of this
virtuous circle, however, depends upon low barriers to innovation and entry
by edge providers, which drive end-user demand. Restricting edge

116. Michael Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons
Symposium on “The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age”:
Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry (Feb. 8, 2004).
117. Preserving
the
Open
Internet,
25
FCC
Rcd.
1834
(3)
(2010),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-10-201A1.pdf (“the 2010 Order”).
118. Reno v. Am. C.L. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (emphasis added).
119. 2010 Order, supra note 117, at 113.
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providers’ ability to reach end users, and limiting end users’ ability to choose
which edge providers to patronize, would reduce the rate of innovation at the
edge and, in turn, the likely rate of improvements to network
infrastructure.”120 In FCC vernacular, “End user” refers to any individual or
entity that uses a broadband Internet access service; we sometimes use
“subscriber” or “consumer” to refer to those end users that subscribe to a
particular broadband Internet access service. . .. . . We use “edge provider”
to refer to content, application, service, and device providers, because they
generally operate at the edge rather than the core of the network.”121 The
FCC recognizes that “These activities are not mutually exclusive. For
example, individuals who generate and share content such as personal blogs
or Facebook pages are both end users and edge providers.” 122 Yet, even in
the face of the fact that all end-users are content creators (“edge-providers”),
the FCC persists in opposing the two, because, it argues, “this basic
taxonomy provides a useful model for evaluating the risk and magnitude of
harms from loss of openness.”123 It may be so, but only to the extent that
“harms” are measured in dollar amounts potentially lost by commercial
entities whose product distribution is being hindered by ISP’s two-sided
pricing schemes. For the FCC to oppose (consumerist) end-users to
(commercial) edge providers contributes to reinforcing the narrative of the
Internet being mostly important to commerce, and to eluding the significance
of the Internet as an integral tool of culture and democratic progress. This
framing by the FCC is not surprising, as the development of the informationindustrial complex has led to a “symbiosis between the states and the
corporations,” where “the metrics for policy success became aligned to those
of the markets.”124 In other words, as Monica Horten put it, “[t]here is
therefore a sharp political divide between the user-empowerment narrative
and the market-led perspective of policymaking.”125 But this dominant
framing creates a major issue, because, as Janet Abbate noted, “[h]istories
that focus on the dominant players, those with the resources to create
expensive new technologies, run the risk of privileging their visions in a
contemporary Internet system that has, and should take into account, a much
broader scope and constituency. Definitions that locate the defining features
of the Internet in situated social practices can help challenge the claim of
hardware- and software-builders to speak for the Internet. In the arena of

120. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 3 n.2.
122. Id. at 11.
123. Id.
124. MONICA HORTEN, THE CLOSING OF THE NET 16-18 (2016); see generally SHAWN M. POWERS
& MICHAEL JABLONSKI, THE REAL CYBER WAR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNET FREEDOM
(2015) (discussing the information-industrial complex and its development).
125. HORTEN, supra note 124, at 19.
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public policy, histories that frame the Internet as the evolution of the public
sphere can support arguments for protecting freedom of speech or subsidized
public access in a way that histories framing the Internet as an entertainment
service or a vehicle for private expression would not.”126 Conversely, the
FCC’s vernacular, which was used again in the 2015 and 2017 Orders,
further eludes thinking about the impact of two-sided pricing models on
these content-creating, non-commercial, end-users.
Such opposition between end users and edge providers is easy to grasp
for most, because it makes the Internet fit into old-world media categories,
within a familiar framework where people are either producers or consumers.
But this radio-TV-world analysis is far outdated. In reality, “end-users” are
themselves all publishers. Whether we publish a personal website, a blog,
shout an announcement to a listserv, or send an email, we are no less content
providers than Netflix, CNN.com, or MLB.com. There is a difference in
degree, but not in nature, as far as the definition of a publisher is concerned.
This false dichotomy is reinforced by narratives put forth by many influential
pro-net neutrality activists themselves. Just like Chairman Powell had
stressed that we needed “Power to the People” because “there are people who
may very well want to buy that ‘junk’ and pay us more than we ever dreamed
for it,” if only we get access to the “Internet’s open architecture” and to EBay, so did Chad Dickerson, CEO of Etsy, in a well-publicized testimony
before the US House of Representatives in 2015. After reminding the
lawmakers that “Etsy is an online marketplace where you can buy handmade
and vintage goods from artists, designers, and collectors around the world
. . .. . . 88% are women. Most are sole proprietors who work from home, and
they depend on Etsy income to pay their bills and support their families,”
and that “Our members understand what’s at stake,” he went on to tell the
teary-eye story of Tina, an Etsy seller from Spring Valley, Illinois, [who]
captured the sentiments of many micro-businesses when she wrote, “We rely
on all my sales to make ends meet. Any change in those and it’s the
difference between balanced meals for my children and cereal for dinner.”127
Aside of this public relations exercise in benevolence by the CEO of a
publicly-traded company, generally, most of mainstream media’s reporting
on net neutrality violations covered commercial, for-profit enterprises, from

126. Janet Abbate, What and where is the Internet? (Re)defining Internet
histories, INTERNET HISTORIES, Mar. 2017, at 13.
127. Chad Dickerson, CEO, Etsy Inc., Address before the U.S. House of Representative Committee
on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee of Communications and Technology: Testimony on Protecting
the
Internet
and
Consumers
through
Congressional
Action
(Jan.
21,
2015),
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/Testim
ony-CT-Dickerson-Internet-Consumers-Congressional-Action-2015-1-21.pdf.
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Skype128 to Netflix129 to Google Voice,130 whose content or apps were
blocked by wireline or wireless ISPs.131
Such coverage does not mean that small and/or not-for-profit speakers
have not suffered in an era devoid of enforceable net neutrality rules, but,
rather, that these content creators do not make the news, and neither do
political speakers who are shut out of the marketplace of ideas, without due
process, by oligopolistic ISPs. Even John Oliver, whose contribution to
putting the importance of net neutrality in the public eye and shifting FCC
Chairman Wheeler’s position on the topic is well documented and should
not be understated,132 fell into the trap of reducing the Internet to a
consumerist platform. To illustrate the harm caused by the implementation
of two-sided pricing models by ISPs, he jokingly suggested that his “startup
video streaming service, Nutflix, a one-stop resource for videos of men
getting hit in the nuts,” wouldn’t be able to compete with wealthy companies
like Netflix who are able to pay the ISPs’ tolls. While hilarious, this constant
representation of the Internet as a place focused on commerce and mindless
entertainment marginalizes speakers who are not part of the capitalist
mainstream, these very content creators who have historically made the
Internet interesting before it became mostly about online shopping, reruns of
The Office, and cute cat videos.133 Obfuscating the role of average Internet

128. Steven Cherry, The VoIP Backlash: Internet-based telephony saves consumers money by
bypassing traditional carriers——but new software lets the carriers block those pennies-per-minute calls,
IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 1, 2005), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-voip-backlash; Philip Elmer-DeWitt,
Group asks FCC to probe iPhone Skype restrictions, FORTUNE (Apr. 3, 2009),
https://fortune.com/2009/04/03/group-asks-fcc-to-probe-iphone-skype-restrictions/.
129. LastWeekTonight, Net Neutrality: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE
(June 1, 2014), https://youtu.be/fpbOEoRrHyU; Juliana Reyes, This graph shows how Netflix speeds
changed after Comcast deal, TECHNICALLY (May 9, 2014), https://technical.ly/philly/2014/05/09/graphshows-netflix-speeds-changed-comcast-deal-comcast-roundup/.
130. Nilay Patel, AT&T, Apple and Google respond to the FCC over Google Voice and the iPhone
App Store, ENGADGET (Aug. 21, 2009), https://www.engadget.com/2009/08/21/atandt-tells-the-fcc-ithad-no-role-in-removing-google-voice-fro/.
131. See also Joint Comments of Internet Engineers, Pioneers, and Technologists on the Technical
Flaws in the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rule-making and the Need for the Light-Touch, Bright-Line
Rules from the Open Internet Order at 33-35, 39-40, 42, 82 Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May 18, 2017) (to
be codified at 47 CFR pt. 8, 20), WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017), https://www.eff.org/document/internetengineers-commentsfcc-nn.
132. Brook Boliek, Alex Byers, & Bill Duryea, The FCC chair’s Internet pivot, POLITICO (Feb. 2,
2015), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/tom-wheeler-net-neutrality-114785.
133. See Net Neutrality: What You Need to Know Now,
FREE PRESS,
https://www.freepress.net/issues/free-open-Internet/net-neutrality/net-neutrality-what-you-need-knownow (last visited Oct. 4, 2021) (“The consequences will be particularly devastating for marginalized
communities media outlets have misrepresented or failed to serve. People of color, the LGBTQ
community, indigenous peoples and religious minorities in the United States rely on the open Internet to
organize, access economic and educational opportunities, and fight back against systemic discrimination.
Without Net Neutrality, how will activists be able to fight oppression? What will happen to social
movements like the Movement for Black Lives? How will the next disruptive technology, business or
company emerge if Internet service providers let only incumbents succeed? The open Internet allows
people of color to tell their own stories and organize for racial justice. When activists are able to turn out
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users in creating content that has value besides sheer entertainment makes it
more difficult to think about the impact of two-sided pricing models on
politics, community involvement, the arts, and on democracy in general.
And that impact is more than speculation by radical activists or theoretical
ramblings by law, economics, history, or computer science academics.
There is plenty of evidence that political speech, on both ends of the
spectrum, from anti-Iraq-war groups to pro-choice and white-nationalist
activists, have been shut out of the publishing game by American ISPs.134

thousands of people in the streets at a moment’s notice, it’s because ISPs aren’t allowed to block their
messages or websites . . . . The mainstream media have long misrepresented, ignored and harmed people
of color. And thanks to systemic racism, economic inequality and runaway media consolidation, people
of color own just a handful of broadcast stations. This dynamic will only get worse: In 2017, Chairman
Pai demolished the media-ownership rules to pave the way for even more consolidation. The lack of
diverse ownership is why news outlets have gotten away with criminalizing and dehumanizing
communities of color. The open Internet allows people of color and other marginalized communities to
bypass traditional media gatekeepers. Without Net Neutrality, ISPs can block speech and prevent
dissident voices from speaking freely online. Without Net Neutrality, people of color are losing a vital
platform. And without Net Neutrality, millions of small businesses that people of color own won’t be
able to compete against larger corporations online, which will deepen economic disparities.”).
134. John M. Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and the Quest for a
Balanced Policy 13, 34TH TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE (TPRC), Sept. 2006,
available at http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~peha/balanced_net_neutrality_policy.pdf (“In 2003, Cumulus
Broadcasting and Cox Radio banned the radio play of music from the Dixie Chicks after one member
criticized President George W. Bush and the war in Iraq, in spite of the fact that the multi-Grammywinning artists had the most popular country song in the US at the time, and none of their antiwar
sentiments were reflected in their songs. Radio stations have the right to play only what they wish. After
all, there are many radio stations, so if listeners are unhappy with the offerings of one station, they can
try another. However, users of broadband Internet do not have so many options. Members of the
Telecommunications Union in Canada were reminded of this during a labor dispute in 2005, when the
ISP Telus blocked access to a web site that was trying to disseminate the union’s views”); see generally
Kevin Graham, Protest Draws Attention to Memo, TAMPA BAY TIMES, June 3, 2005; Brad Friedman,
COMCAST KILLS EMAIL FROM ‘AFTERDOWNINGSTREET’ COALITION!, THE BRADBLOG (July 15,
2015), http://www.bradblog.com/?p=1603 (cited in DAWN NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET
NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE 5-6 (2009) (discussing how in 2005, Comcast
blocked incoming emails sent from AfterDowningStreet, an anti-Iraq-war group, to its subscribers, a fact
Comcast acknowledged, although it blamed a third-party vendor for that action); Id. at 7 (citing Winter
Patriot, Censoring Again: Comcast Blocks Emails Linking to Cindy Sheehan Website!, THE BRADBLOG
(Aug. 17, 2005), http://www.bradblog.com/?p=1721 (A month later, “another antiwar organization
experienced difficulty communicating via email with Comcast subscribers. The organization
MeetwithCindy, headed by Cindy Sheehan, an antiwar advocate whose son was killed in the war in Iraq,
had its email communications censored by Comcast, Cox, and other email providers … Once again, as
with the AfterDowningStreet incident, neither the sender nor the intended recipients of the
communications were informed that the emails were being censored, as such blocking was implemented
in a manner that was both transparent either to the sender or the intended recipients.”); Nate Anderson,
Pearl Jam censored by AT&T, calls for a neutral ‘Net, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 9, 2007),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2007/08/pearl-jam-censored-by-att-calls-for-a-neutral-net/ (cited in
DAWN NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE 7-8
(2009)) (AT&T has censored a webcast of a Pearl Jam cover of Pink Floyd’s Another Brick in the Wall,
where the band changed the lyrics “Teacher, leave those kids alone,” to, “George Bush, find yourself
another home,” something AT&T has acknowledged, although calling it “a mistake by a webcast vendor.”
As this instance of net neutrality violation by a large ISP unfolded, Pearl Jam declared: “This, of course,
troubles us as artists but also as citizens concerned with the issue of censorship and the increasingly
consolidated control of the media … What happened to us this weekend was a wake-up call, and it’s
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“Nerdcore” music star Monzy, who represents a style of music that
celebrates geek culture,135 might as well have been speaking in the name of
large US ISPs addressing their “end-users” acting as content providers when
he wrote, in his 2006 hit Kill Dash Nine:
I’ll chown your home and take your access away
Comin’ straight outta Stanfurd, ain’t nobody tougher
Control-X, Control-C, I’ll discard your fuckin’ buffer
You’re outside your scope, son, close them curly brackets
Cause I drop punk-ass bitches like a modem drops packets136

Indeed, “punk-ass bitches” content creators that do not have the favor of
local ISPs get dropped from other users’ sight when the ISP-controlled
network gateways and routers drop their content’s packets to enforce twosided pricing models. But they do not have John Oliver on hand to defend
them, because they are not entertainment-worthy. As Oliver himself put it
sarcastically, “if you want to do something evil, put in inside something
boring.”137 And the fate of democracy, to most, being much more boring
than cute cat videos, Twitter memes, or Instagram selfies, small political,
educational, or artistic speakers have not generally been placed under the
limelight. The consumerist narrative has so far triumphed over the userempowerment narrative in Washington, D.C. policy circles. The result has
been to obfuscate the essential role of the little guy in contributing to the
marketplace of ideas. But in July 2021, both President Biden’s Executive
Order, and former President Trump’s lawsuit against Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube, have put the importance of political speech back into the public
eye, and there is therefore momentum for net neutrality legislation. In the
remainder of this article, I explore what traditional political theory in the
realm of freedom of speech, and the body of case law it has grounded, can
tell us for thinking about net neutrality policy from a normative standpoint,
and fight the depletion of ideas in the marketplace caused by two-sided
about something much bigger than the censorship of a rock band.” They were, indeed, right, and, in fact,
it also is about something much bigger than the censorship of the left end of the political spectrum.);
Robert Dieckmann, The Collapse of American Culture, THE CONSERVATIVE VOICE, May 20, 2007; Jim
Kouri, INTERNET PROVIDERS CENSORING CONSERVATIVE NEWS E-MAIL, NEWSWITHVIEWS
(Apr. 26, 2007), http://www.newswithviews.com/NWVexclusive/exclusive114.htm (cited in DAWN
NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE 7 (2009))
(Conservative speakers have not been spared by large ISPs either. SBC Global and Earthlink have
blocked incoming emails from NewsWithViews and other conservative newsletters, and Verizon has
prevented willing subscribers to NARAL Pro-Choice America’s SMS’ dispatch from receiving such
messages).
135. See, e.g., Allura Dannon, What Is It? Nerdcore, XLR8R (Oct. 28, 2007),
https://www.xlr8r.com/features/what-is-it-nerdcore.
136. Monzy, Kill Dash Nine Lyrics, GENIUS (2006), https://genius.com/Monzy-kill-dash-ninelyrics.
137. LastWeekTonight, Net Neutrality: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE
(June 1, 2014), https://youtu.be/fpbOEoRrHyU.
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pricing models. Drawing particularly from influential political science
scholar Alexander Meiklejohn, and the landmark case Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins,138 I argue that both controlling political philosophy and
Supreme Court precedent give legitimacy to an Anti-Discrimination Act for
Cyberspace which would pass constitutional muster.

VI. FIGHTING THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS’ DEPLETION BY
EXPANDING FREEDOM OF SPEECH THROUGH LEGISLATION

I have demonstrated in Parts I through IV that the implementation of twosided pricing models by last-mile ISPs would drastically affect the way that
the public Internet has historically functioned, because such an
implementation requires turning last mile ISPs, by default, into walled
gardens – the gates of which will only open upon payment by, or other
discriminatory arrangement with, select content providers. I have also
shown that despite their claims that such schemes will boost infrastructure
investments for the benefit of users, and that nobody’s speech will be
suppressed thanks to “dirt roads,” ISPs’ incentive actually is to degrade
service for the majority of users, in order to extract payments by a few large
content providers that have the ability to do so. The likely result of such an
implementation, then, is for small speakers to be shut out of the publishing
game, and for the once-open Internet to drift back towards walled gardens
models of the 1980s where content accessible to the users was drastically
limited, and where freedom of expression was curtailed without due process.
The result is a depletion of the marketplace of ideas. What, then, can be done
to protect freedom of expression over the open Internet, and the overall
wealth of networks?139 I suggest that we turn to traditional American
political philosophy and to the existing body of case law to find the answer.
One of the most important theories that supports free speech jurisprudence
in the United States is that of the “marketplace of ideas.” 140 This theory,
which can be traced back to John Milton and John Stuart Mill, generally
suggests that good ideas will emerge and prevail over bad ideas, but only if

138. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
139. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 29-127 (2006) (discussion of
the networked information economy).
140. Burt Neuborne, An Overview of the Bill of Rights, in FUNDAMENTALS OF AM. LAW 91-92 (Alan
B. Morrison ed., 1998) (“[f]ree speech protection in the United States is … complicated by the lack of a
consensus theory of why we care about protecting speech. Two theories currently vie for acceptance.
One, associated with Alexander Meiklejohn, argues that government interference with the free flow of
information prevents the public from making informed democratic choices… A second theory, associated
with Tom Emerson, argues that free speech is protected, not merely because it is vital to the proper
functioning of democratic institutions, but because self-expression is an essential component of human
dignity… Modern approaches to free speech are often untidy amalgams of the two theories that fail to
acknowledge the tension between an ‘instrumental’ and a ‘dignitary’ vision of free speech.”). In this
article, I chose not to oppose the two theories but to rather focus on what we can learn from Meiklejohn,
with no demerit for Emerson.
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all ideas can freely confront each other in a marketplace – follows that
government curtailment of speech deemed nefarious by a token ruler – no
matter how good the ruler’s intentions - is bad policy, because “wrong”
speech does not get to be exposed and is more likely to proliferate in the
underground than if it were exposed under the light of rational debate.141
Free speech theorist Alexander Meiklejohn provided a modern articulation
of this theory within the framework of the U.S. Constitution. In his 1955
Testimony before Congress on The Meaning of the First Amendment, he
stated that the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed against the
“mutilation of the thinking process of the community,” that “in our popular
discussion, unwise ideas must have a hearing as well as wise ones, dangerous
ideas as well as safe, un-American as well as American,” and that
“[s]uppression is always foolish. Freedom is always wise. That is the faith,
the experimental faith, by which we Americans have undertaken to live.”142
The impact of Meiklejohn’s thought is evident in the Supreme Court’s case
law on political speech since the middle of the 20th century. For example, in
Terminiello v. Chicago,143 the Supreme Court overturned on First
Amendment grounds the conviction for breach of the peace of a bigot who
had made inflammatory comments which resulted in a riot. In the majority
opinion, Justice Douglas stated that “a function of free speech under our
system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions
and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.
That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute . . .. . . is nevertheless
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce
a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest . . .. . . There is no room under
our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead

141. On the marketplace of ideas in free speech jurisprudence in the United States, see generally
LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN
AMERICA (1986); DONALD A. DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1985); STEVEN J. HEYMAN, HATE SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION (1996); Julien
Mailland, Freedom of Speech, the Internet, and the Costs of Control: The French Example, 33 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 1179 (2001); Julien Mailland, The Blues Brothers and the American Constitutional
Protection of Hate Speech: Teaching the Meaning of the First Amendment to Foreign Audiences, 21
MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 443 (2013); ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE
SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979); contra RICHARD DELGADO, MUST WE DEFEND
NAZIS?: HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); Stanley Fish, There’s
No Such Things as Free Speech and It’s a Good Thing Too (Feb. 1992), reprinted in STEVEN J. HEYMAN,
HATE SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION 180 (1996).
142. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948),
reprinted in ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 109-12 (1960).
143. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political
or community groups.”144 The Supreme Court of the United States further
implicitly confirmed the importance of Meiklejohn’s political thought on its
case law when it refused to grant certiorari in the so-called Skokie case.145 In
June, 1977, the National Socialist Party of America applied for a parade
permit from the Village of Skokie, Illinois. Of the population of Skokie, a
Chicago suburb, the majority was Jewish, and a substantial number were
actual holocaust survivors. The nazis planned to assemble in front of the
Village Hall, to “wear uniforms with swastikas,” and to “carry placards
proclaiming free speech for white persons.”146 The Village denied the
permit. The nazis sued the Village, and the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois declared the Village’s attempt to prevent the
parade unconstitutional under the First Amendment and provided injunctive
relief.147 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed.148 The US Supreme Court denied certiorari because, as a
constitutional matter, it was what has been dubbed “an easy case.”149 This
denial to further hear the case was in itself extremely significant, because
nazi speech is so ignominious, and the consequences of its implementation
so horrific, that most sensible people deem it to be “wrong.”150 Yet, in
denying certiorari and confirming the lower courts’ injunctions to let the
nazis parade, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that the freedom of
speech was a value so integral to the US democratic way of life as to
withstand virtually any form of legal balancing.151 In doing so, it implicitly
confirmed that Meiklejohn’s interpretation of the First Amendment is indeed
a controlling force under positive law. Aryeh Neier, the holocaust survivor
who represented the nazis in court and fought for their First Amendment
right to parade, provided a pre-Internet, yet modern, formulation of the
marketplace of ideas theories as applied to the utmost heinous speech:

144. Id.
145. Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
146. Id. at 917.
147. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (1978).
148. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978).
149. See Lee Bollinger & Aryeh Neier, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an ‘Easy Case’ and Free
Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REV. 617 (1982); Martin H. Redish, New Film Explores Skokie’s Battle with
Neo-Nazis, WTTW (Jan. 24, 2013), https://news.wttw.com/2013/01/24/new-film-explores-skokie-sbattle-neo-nazis.
150. Carl Cohen, Skokie—The Extreme Test, THE NATION, Apr. 15, 1978, at 422, 428. (“[t]he
principle that ‘Congress shall make no law’ . . . . is perennially tested by American Nazis . . . . By
presenting the extreme case, these Nazis provide an instructive test of a very good principle.”); see also
Julien Mailland, The Blues Brothers and the American Constitutional Protection of Hate Speech:
Teaching the Meaning of the First Amendment to Foreign Audiences, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 443,
450 n.49 (2013).
151. Julien Mailland, Freedom of Speech, the Internet, and the Costs of Control: The French
Example, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1179, 1183 (2001).

82

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

44:1

I supported free speech for Nazis when they wanted to march in Skokie in
order to defeat Nazis. Defending my enemy is the only way to protect a free
society against the enemies of freedom . .. . .. . . I could not bring myself to
advocate freedom of speech in Skokie if I did not believe that the chances are
best for preventing a repetition of the Holocaust in a society where every
incursion on freedom is resisted.152

As the Skokie case illustrates, Meiklejohn’s work in decrypting the meaning
of the First Amendment has provided an ideological basis for fundamental
cases expanding the right to free speech for Americans to an extent
unmatched in any other country. A core point to be made here is that the
First Amendment is itself a regulation. It is a regulation that frees, because
it prevents those in control of the physical facility where speech is to be
conducted from discriminating against speech they do not favor by simply
cutting access of disfavored speakers to said physical facility. This is
precisely what the 2015 Open Internet Order did when it banned blocking,
throttling, and paid prioritization. In that sense, such net neutrality regulation
is, simply, an anti-discrimination act for cyberspace, one that brings the
spirit of the First Amendment into the digital age.
Yet, in today’s politically-polarized America, the very idea of net
neutrality regulation has been spun to mean something different. “Profreedom” politicians such as Senator Ted Cruz have claimed that “‘Net
Neutrality’ is Obamacare for the Internet; the Internet should not operate at
the speed of government.” 153 When Chairman Ajit Pai’s FCC issued the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that set the recall of net neutrality
regulations in the 2017 Order in motion (“the 2017 NPRM”),154 it framed the
2015 Order as a government takeover over the Internet. The decision to
(properly) reclassify ISPs as common carriers under Title II of the 1996, the
NPRM declared, “represented a massive and unprecedented shift in favor of
government control of the Internet.”155 The very title of the NPRM, “In The
Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom,” is a rhetorical artifice used to suggest
that the 2015 Open Internet Order had diminished freedom on the Internet,
and to portray proponents of net neutrality as opponents of a free Internet.
The 2017 NPRM, I have argued elsewhere, is in fact “little more than a
political document pursuing a political agenda rather than a well-reasoned
legal analysis objectively applying the facts as required by the

152. ARYEH NEIER,
OF FREEDOM 1-3 (1979).
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153. Senator Ted Cruz (@SenTedCruz), TWITTER (Nov. 10, 2014, 10:43 AM),
https://twitter.com/sentedcruz/status/531834493922189313.
154. Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. 25568 (proposed on May 23, 2017) (to be codified
at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8, 20) [hereinafter the 2017 NPRM].
155. 2017 NPRM, supra note 154, at 25570.
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Administrative Procedures Act.”156 In fact, the NPRM embraced “the same
rhetorical tools as the broadband Internet service providers and their industry
trade associations, which is to confuse the public and suggest that they are
the real supporters of an ‘open Internet.’”157 But that rhetoric is flawed.
Regulation can free. This seemingly radical-and-internally-inconsistent
suggestion is actually neither radical nor internally inconsistent. In 2010,
The Economist, a newspaper that can hardly been accused of publishing
socialist pamphlets or being a breeding ground for the radical left, took a
stance in favor of Internet regulation. It specifically pushed for requiring
“telecom operators to open their high-speed networks to rivals on a
wholesale basis as is the case almost everywhere in the industrialized world”
(but something the Obama FCC itself had not dared even considering, as it
did forbear from a majority of provisions of Title II of the 1996 Act in the
2015 Open Internet Order).158 The conservative British outlet wrote: “This
newspaper has always championed free trade, open markets, and vigorous
competition in the physical world. The same principles should be applied on
the Internet as well.”159 The Economist editorialists understand well,
contrary to what they call “those on the right [who] see net neutrality as a
socialist plot to regulate the Internet,”160 that regulation, when well designed,
can indeed restore free trade and open markets when these have been
compromised (in that case, by “the lack of competition in broadband
access.”)161 Indeed, what holds true in the marketplace of goods and services
156. Reply Comments of Barbara A. Cherry, Julien Mailland, & Matt Pierce at 1, In the Matter of
Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May 18, 2017) (to be codified at 47 CFR pt. 8
and
20)
(Aug.
29,
2017),
WC
Docket
No.
17-108
(2017),
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1209736308391/Cherry%20Mailland%20Pierce%20Reply%20Comments%
20WC%20Docket%2017-108.pdf.
157. Id.; see, e.g., Comments of AT&T Services Inc. at 1, In the Matter of Restoring Internet
Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108 (“AT&T supports an open Internet, as do essentially all broadband
ISPs”); Comments of the NCTA – The Internet & Television Association at 54 n.215, In the Matter of
Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108 (citing NCTA, Reaffirming Our Commitment to an
Open Internet, PLATFORM (May 17, 2017), https://www.ncta.com/platform/public-policy/reaffirmingour-commitment-to-an-open-Internet/); Comments of USTELECOM Association at ii, WC Docket No.
17-108 (“Our broadband provider members have long been committed to delivering to their customers an
open Internet that meets consumer expectations”); Comments of Verizon at 5, WC Docket No. 17-108
(“As we have explained before, Verizon is committed to an open Internet. We have invested billions of
dollars in businesses that rely on the open Internet, which our customers view as essential and which is
therefore a critical ingredient to our success”); Comments of Comcast Corporation at 52-53, WC Docket
No. 17-108 (citing May 2017 Joint ISP Commitment) (“As noted above, Comcast has consistently
supported open Internet protections and will continue to do so regardless of what legal framework is in
place. The consensus principles of openness on which the Internet was built are a core component of
Comcast’s commitment to its customers. Indeed, Comcast has prominently and unequivocally
reaffirmed—in advertisements, blog posts, and elsewhere—that we’ve always been committed to an open
Internet that gives you the freedom to be in charge of your own online experience. And that will not
change”).
158. See Cherry, Mailland & Pierce, supra note 156, at 12-15.
159. The web’s new walls, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 4. 2010, at 11.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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also holds true in the marketplace of ideas. And the digital open networks
of networks had become just the place to realize the vision of the likes of
John Milton. Consider this classic, 1945 statement by Justice Jackson:
[t]he very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority
from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press,
speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman for
truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true
from the false for us.162

Layer over it a statement made 70 years later by Apple co-founder Steve
Wozniak:
The Internet when it first came, it was a breath of fresh air, it was so free,
nobody owned the Internet space. . .. . . it was worldwide, it was people to
people, it was like we little people of the world all of a sudden had this
incredible resource and we didn’t have to go through other people selling it to
us…
I think that a lot of online social interactions will be curbed . . .. . . I fear . . .. . .
that the gatekeepers, those who can turn on and off switches, allow certain
things, disallow other things, allow who gets to send me data . . .. . . rather
than anyone having equal say so of reaching me, yeah, I fear that very strongly
. . .. . . especially net neutrality, issues like that. . .. . . Internet freedom is
being interfered with in major ways, and it shouldn’t. . .. . . I’m an optimist,
and I believe we can move more and more towards net neutrality. The trouble
is, a lot of it has to be enforced by the government, and conservative types and
libertarian types say “government shouldn’t have any say and control over
that, that takes away our freedom.” Wrong! It takes away the freedom of the
companies that are taking away the freedom from us. Every freedom we have
in the United States, every one of them, was given to us by Congressional
regulation, it’s called the Bill of Rights. That is what gives us our freedom,
and yet it was from the government, it was government regulation. No, there
are times when government regulation says “you will not impede with the
Internet neutrality of the users.”163

Wozniak’s statement is simply an Internet-age reformulation of Justice
Jackson’s 1945 statement, and of Meiklejohn’s interpretation of the First
Amendment. For Meiklejohn went much farther than suggesting that
“unwise ideas must have a hearing.”164 While arguing against governmental
suppression of speech, he concomitantly provided an argument in favor of
positive government action that would expand the freedom of speech through

162. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
163. RT, Wozniak: Web crackdown coming, freedom failing, YOUTUBE (Aug. 14, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJnghGBBP2Q.
164. Alexander Meiklejohn, Testimony on the Meaning of the First Amendment, Address before the
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights, Hearings, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955, reprinted in ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 109 (1960).
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regulation. Commenting on the meaning of the sentence “Congress shall
make no law … abridging the freedom of speech,” Meiklejohn noted:
[B]y those words, Congress is not debarred from all action upon freedom of
speech. Legislation which abridges that freedom is forbidden, but not
legislation to enlarge and enrich it. The freedom of the mind which befits the
members of a self-governing society is not a given and fixed part of human
nature. It can be increased and established by learning, by teaching, by the
unhindered flow of accurate information, by giving men health and vigor and
security, by bringing them together in activities of communication and mutual
understanding. And the federal legislature is not forbidden to engage in that
positive enterprise of cultivating the general intelligence upon which the
success of self-government so obviously depends. On the contrary, in that
positive field the Congress of the United States has a heavy and basic
responsibility to promote the freedom of speech.”165

A net neutrality regulation that prevents blocking, throttling, and paid
prioritization does not abridge the freedom of speech of Internet users; it
instead reinforces it, in a world where the marketplace of ideas has physically
shifted from the public square to a privately-owned apparatus of copper or
fiberoptic cable. Such regulation is simply a non-discrimination act for
cyberspace, which protects against the “mutilation of the thinking process of
the community,” which Meiklejohn warned Congress against in 1955.166 His
words have never been more modern and relevant.
But would such a regulation by Congress survive judicial scrutiny when it
would clearly – at least to a feeble extent – interfere with ISPs’ property
rights, and potentially be construed as forced speech in violation of the First
Amendment?167
There indeed is legal precedent supporting the
constitutionality of such expansion of freedom of speech through regulation,
even in the face of private-property rights recognized over the facility
through which the speech is expressed. I have already argued elsewhere that
the FCC, if it were to impose net neutrality regulations on ISPs under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, either under Section 706 in conjunction
with Title I, or under Title II, would likely pass constitutional muster if

165. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948),
reprinted in ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 19-20 (2d ed., 1960) (emphasis added).
166. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 165.
167. ISPs have already argued that net neutrality rules adopted in the FCC 2010 Open Internet Order
were unconstitutional under the First Amendment, but the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals did not rule on
this constitutional challenge. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). See a discussion of the
Verizon case’s First Amendment aspects in Barbara Cherry & Julien Mailland, Toward Sustainable
Network-Openness Obligations on Broadband in the U.S.: Surviving Providers’ First Amendment
Challenges, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE (TPRC), Geo. Mason U. School of
Law, Arlington, VA (Sept. 13, 2014); Susan Crawford, First Amendment Common Sense, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 2343 (2014).
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challenged on First Amendment grounds.168 Said opinion has been cited by
the FCC in the 2105 Open Internet Order in support of enforcing net
neutrality.169 The purpose of the present article, however, is not to discuss
fine points of administrative and constitutional law as they apply to the FCC
under the 1996 Act, but, rather, to ground a new net neutrality law in a First
Amendment political theory recognized as controlling by positive law. If
Congress itself was to cut the Gordian Knot by passing new legislation from
a blank slate, could Meiklejohn’s insights and judicial precedent regarding
political speech ground an Anti-Discrimination Act for Cyberspace? To
think about this question, I turn to a leading Supreme Court case infused with
Meiklejohn’s First Amendment insights, Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins.170
In Pruneyard, a group of California high school students had set up a
table in the central courtyard of a privately-owned shopping center named
Pruneyard. They peacefully distributed pamphlets and solicited signatures
for a petition against a United Nations resolution against “Zionism.” A
security guard soon asked them to leave. They complied, and subsequently
filed a lawsuit which sought to enjoin the shopping center from denying them
access to its facility for the purpose of circulating their petition. 171 After
facing a couple of setbacks in the lower courts, the teenagers prevailed before
the California Supreme Court. The state high court ruled that they were
allowed to conduct their speech activities on Pruneyard’s private property,
because the California Constitution contains a positively phrased provision
that actively protects “speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in
shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned.”172 In deciding
that the California Constitution gave the teenagers a “right to solicit
signatures on [the private mall’s] property in exercising their state rights of

168. Barbara Cherry & Julien Mailland, supra note 167; see also Reply Comments of Professor
Barbara A. Cherry & Assistant Professor Julien Mailland, Before the Federal Communications
Commission Washington, D.C. 20554, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 1428, Framework for Broadband Internet Service, GN Docket No. 10-27, Preserving the Open Internet, GN
Docket No. 09-191, Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket no. 07-52 (Sept. 2014),
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7522644794.pdf.
169. “Other commenters respond that broadband providers are not engaged in speech when
providing broadband Internet access services, so they are not entitled to First Amendment protections in
their operation of these services… Consistent with our determination in the 2010 Open Internet Order,
we find that when broadband providers offer broadband Internet access services, they act as conduits for
the speech of others, not as speakers themselves.” 2015 FCC Open Internet Order at 268, 30 FCC Rcd
5601 (2015), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-15-24A1.pdf (citing Reply Comments of
Professor Barbara A. Cherry & Assistant Professor Julien Mailland, Before the Federal Communications
Commission Washington, D.C. 20554, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 1428; Framework for Broadband Internet Service, GN Docket No. 10-27; Preserving the Open Internet, GN
Docket No. 09-191; Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket no. 07-52 (Sept. 2013)).
170. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
171. Id. at 77.
172. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979).
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free expression and petition,” the state’s high court rejected the mall’s “claim
that recognition of such a right violated [their] ‘right to exclude others,’
which is a fundamental component of their federally protected property
rights.”173 The US Supreme Court deferred to the state’s high court’s
construction of the state constitution as protecting “speech and petitioning,
reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are
privately owned.”174 It then addressed the two federal constitutional
questions presented: “whether state constitutional provisions, which permit
individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on the property of a
privately owned shopping center to which the public is invited, violate the
shopping center owner’s property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments or his free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.”175 In a sweeping 9-0 decision, it concluded that neither the
Fifth nor the First Amendment rights of the privately owned facility had been
violated by the state law. This decision is particularly relevant to the debate
on net neutrality, because a privately-owned mall which serves, de facto, as
a public forum in the analog world, bears striking similarities with a
privately-owned set of pipes and switches which also serve, de facto, as a
public forum in the digital age.
On the Fifth Amendment question, the Pruneyard Court found that “a
State, in the exercise of its police power, may adopt reasonable restrictions
on private property so long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking
without just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional
provision.”176 The Supreme Court found the California Constitution
federally permissible in this regard. In doing so, it noted that “[t]he
requirement that [the shopping center] permit [the outside speakers] to
exercise state-protected rights of free expression and petition on shopping
center property does not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of
appellants’ property rights under the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
appellants having failed to demonstrate that the ‘right to exclude others’ is
so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the stateauthorized limitation of it amounted to a ‘taking.’”177 A detailed description
of ISPs 5th Amendment rights is far outside the scope of this paper,178 but it
is generally worth noting that the very business model of ISPs, just like the
mall, is to provide service indiscriminately to the public, and to provide
access for the customers to the whole Internet. Any “right to exclude others”
would therefore be antithetical to the ISPs’ business model, just like it was

173. 447 U.S. at 79-80.
174. Id. at 78, citing 592 P.2d 347.
175. Id. at 76-77.
176. Id. at 75.
177. Id.
178. On this topic, see generally Cherry & Mailland, supra note 167.
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in Pruneyard. In this sense, then, the situation of the Pruneyard mall and
ISPs vis a vis speech activities conducted over their facility and which they
deem undesirable are very similar. The Pruneyard’s Fifth Amendment
rationale would therefore likely support an Anti-Discrimination Act for
Cyberspace passing constitutional muster.
In holding that the California law passed First Amendment muster and
that positive law did not “ex proprio vigore limit a State’s authority to
exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own constitution
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution,”179 the US Supreme Court applied a three-prong test: “[t]he
shopping center, by choice of its owner, is not limited to the personal use of
appellants, and the views expressed by members of the public in passing out
pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition thus will not likely be
identified with those of the owner. Furthermore, no specific message is
dictated by the State to be displayed on appellants’ property, and appellants
are free to publicly dissociate themselves from the views of the speakers or
handbillers.”180 Just like with the Fifth Amendment issue, with regard to the
First Amendment, the similarities between the shopping center and ISPs are
striking. When it comes to the first prong, that the physical facility not be
limited to the personal use of its owners, just like in Pruneyard, the Internet
access facilities maintained by the ISPs are not limited to the personal use of
the ISPs. Quite the contrary, in fact, since the very business model of the
IPSs is to carry the speech of others, to let others use the ISPs’ privately
owned facilities to distribute their information. As Verizon’s lawyers
themselves noted in a court filing, “the Internet service provider performs a
pure transmission or “conduit” function . . .. . . This function is analogous to
the role played by common carriers in transmitting information selected and
controlled by others. Traditionally, this passive role of conduit for the
expression of others has not created any duties or liabilities under the
copyright laws.”181 In other words, according to Verizon itself, an ISP
cannot be liable for copyright violation for the infringing speech of others
that is conducted over its facility, because it is obvious that the ISP is not the
speaker. Consequently, referring to the Supreme Court’s second prong, the
views expressed by online speakers “thus will not likely be identified with
those of the owner” of the Internet access facility. Therefore, Pruneyard’s

179. 447 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).
180. Id.
181. Brief for Appellant at 23, Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Serv., 351 F.3d.
1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-7015 & 03-7053).
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second test would likely be met in the case of a net neutrality law prohibiting
blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization by the ISPs. 182
Finally, regarding Pruneyard’s third prong, that no specific message be
dictated by the State to be displayed on the facility owner’s property, and
that the facility owner be free to publicly dissociate themselves from the
views of the speakers, a net neutrality law prohibiting blocking, throttling,
and paid prioritization by the ISPs would simply be an anti-discrimination
act for cyberspace and would in no way dictate the ISPs to distribute any
message over their facilities. ISPs would not be required for example, to
display a “live free or die” banner on the computer screen of their customers
when a web browser is opened, something that would likely be
unconstitutional under Wooley v. Maynard.183 And, ISPs would remain free,
as they already do today, “to publicly disassociate themselves from the views
of the speakers” using their facility. Compare Verizon’s own disclaimer, in
this regard: “Verizon assumes no responsibility for . .. . .. . . any Content
. .. . .. . . and . .. . .. . . Verizon does not endorse any advice or opinion
contained therein,”184 with those placated outside supermarkets and malls in
California as a direct result of Pruneyard:

182. See a similar analysis in Nicholas Bramble, Ill Telecommunications: How Internet
Infrastructure Providers Lose First Amendment Protection, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 67,
89-93 (2010).
183. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
184. See
Verizon
Online
Terms
of
Service
16-2,
(July
24,
2016),
https://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/Internet_ToS_07242016.pdf.
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Figure 5: A disclaimer placated outside of a California Wal-Mart reads:
“Wal-Mart apologizes for any inconvenience caused by solicitors outside our
store. We do not advocate their view or methods of expression. Their
presence on our property is currently permitted by California Court
Decisions.”185
In both cases, the facility owner actively ensures that the speech expressed
by third-parties over the facility “will not likely be identified with [the
speech] of the [facility’s] owner.” The third prong of the Pruneyard First
Amendment test would therefore also easily be met, if Congress passed an
Anti-Discrimination Act for Cyberspace: “no specific message is dictated by
the State” when a law is designed to guarantee neutrality of treatment of all
speakers by the facility owner and is therefore, by definition, content
neutral.186
In ruling in Pruneyard, the Supreme Court embraced Alexander
Meiklejohn’s interpretation of the First Amendment, which stressed that
“[l]egislation which abridges that freedom [of speech] is forbidden, but not
legislation to enlarge and enrich it.”

185. Photograph of disclaimer outside a Wal-Mart store in Mountain View, California (Feb. 12,
2006).
186. See Bramble, supra note 182.

Winter 2021

FOR AN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT FOR CYBERSPACE

91

VII. CONCLUSION
Privately-owned Internet access facilities have become, de facto, the new
public square. That public square, in the early days of the open Internet, was
subject to a one-sided pricing model, which ensured access to all speakers to
it, on a neutral basis. The implementation of two-sided pricing models by
ISPs, by its very economic and technical logic, instead creates walled
gardens. These walled gardens lead to a depletion of ideas in the
marketplace. This trend is exacerbated by a shift, in the policy realm, from
a user-empowerment narrative that focused, as the Reno court did, on the
user as publisher, to one that reduces the empowering nature of the Internet
to “consumer empowerment.” It is time to reintroduce “the little guys on
their electronic soapboxes” in the policy narrative. In this realm, Alexander
Meiklejohn’s thought, and cases such as Pruneyard, have never been so
relevant. Not just for Netflix and Etsy, but for the myriad of small speakers
using the electronic soap box to perform in the public sphere and maintain
the vibrant marketplace of ideas which is at the core of First Amendment
jurisprudence and of American political philosophy ideals generally. This
has not escaped FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel: we have “a duty
to protect what has made the Internet the most dynamic platform for free
speech ever invented. It is our printing press. It is our town square. It is our
individual soapbox.”187 It is urgent for Congress to step up and guarantee,
through new legislation, that political speakers will be free to setup their soap
box on the ISP-maintained digital public square: an Anti-Discrimination Act
for Cyberspace. Controlling political philosophy rhetoric in the field of free
speech and Supreme Court precedent certainly give legitimacy to this path.

187. Statement of Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet,
GN Docket No. 14-28, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-15-24A4.pdf.
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